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1. Introduction
For	nearly	a	century,	skepticism	about	other	minds	(SOM)	has	been	
a	standard	problem	in	epistemology.	In	recent	accounts	of	social	cog-
nition,	however,	the	success	of	simulation	theory	and	theory-theory	
have	moved	philosophical	discussion	about	other	minds	away	from	
SOM.1	 Precedent	 for	 this	 move	 can	 be	 found	 in	 an	 unlikely	 place,	
namely	 in	René	Descartes’	philosophy,	 for	Descartes	so	diminished	
the	role	of	 the	senses	 in	gaining	knowledge	that	SOM	is	precluded	
from	 becoming	 a	 self-standing	 skeptical	 challenge.	 At	 most,	 SOM	
is	just	one	more	incarnation	of	skepticism	about	the	external	world.	
Further,	Descartes	 rejected	 the	natural	possibility	of	 a	human	body	
existing	without	a	mind.	We	are	all	familiar	with	the	real	distinction	
between	 body	 and	mind,	 which,	 at	 first	 blush,	 speaks	 against	 this	
claim,	but	while	a	body	in	general	can	exist	without	a	mind,	a	unique-
ly	human	body	 cannot.	Descartes	 indicated	 all	 this	 in	 a	number	of	
places	 and	 especially	 in	 his	 correspondence	 with	 the	 Cambridge	
Platonist	Henry	More,	who	asked	how	we	know	infants	have	minds.	
Descartes	replied	by	citing	genetic	facts—natural	facts—about	the	ori-
gin	of	a	human	body	which	assure	us	 that	where	we	find	a	human	
body	we	necessarily	find	a	human	mind.	We	can	therefore	reconstruct	
an	 answer	 to	 SOM	on	Descartes’	 behalf	 that	 fundamentally	 rejects	
skeptical	doubts	unique	to	our	knowledge	of	other	minds.	And,	as	a	
consequence,	we	can	further	unsettle	the	common	presumption	that	
the	human	body	is	a	straightforward	object	of	physical	study.	To	the	
contrary,	 it	 looks	 to	be	a	unique	object	 that,	 in	 its	entirety,	belongs	
neither	to	the	metaphysician	nor	to	the	physicist.
In	what	 follows,	 I	expand	and	defend	 these	claims.	 I	 start	 in	 sec-
tion	two	with	SOM’s	true	progenitor,	the	seventeenth-century	French	
Cartesian	Gerauld	de	Cordemoy.	There	I	will	show	that	the	emergence	
of	SOM	in	the	seventeenth	century	(and	more	generally	 for	anyone	
who	is	not	an	idealist)	is	tied	to	a	conception	of	the	human	body	as	
a	 living,	 functioning	 body	with,	 at	most,	 a	 contingent	 relation	 to	 a	
1.	 This	already	vast	literature	continues	to	grow.	For	an	accessible	discussion	of	
the	competing	views	and	some	of	the	conceptual	and	methodological	issues	
at	stake,	see	Apperly	2008.	
ImprintPhilosophers’
	 gideon	manning Descartes, Other Minds and Impossible Human Bodies
philosophers’	imprint	 –		2		–	 vol.	12,	no.	16	(november	2012)
that	“the	other	minds	problem	received	its	first	clear	formulation	by	
John	Stuart	Mill	in	the	nineteenth	century”.3	Buford	is	referring	to	the	
epistemological	 problem.	 To	 clarify	 this	 point,	 it	 will	 help	 to	 distin-
guish	this	problem	from	three	others.	The	first	is	the	ordinary problem.	
On	countless	occasions,	we	would	all	like	to	know	what	someone	else	
is	thinking,	and	the	ordinary	problem	is	rooted	in	this	simple	everyday	
challenge:	What	justifies	our	belief	that	someone	is	thinking	a	particu-
lar	thought?	The	existence	of	other	minds	is	not	at	issue	in	these	con-
texts,	and	no	one	could	possibly	claim	to	have	introduced	this	problem.	
Distinct	from	the	epistemological	problem	and	the	ordinary	problem	
is	the	conceptual problem:	How	do	I	so	much	as	conceive	of	other	minds,	
or	how	can	my	mental	concepts	refer	to	others’	mental	states?4	Finally,	
there	is	the	descriptive problem:	how	do	we	actually	go	about	attribut-
ing	mental	states	to	others?	This	last	problem	has	received	the	most	
attention	of	late,	with	simulation	theory	and	theory-theory	prominent	
answers	in	the	literature.
Thomas	Buford’s	claim	about	the	origin	of	SOM	notwithstanding,	
Descartes	is	frequently	identified	as	the	source	of	all	things	skeptical.5 
And,	of	course,	Descartes	wrote	a	great	deal	that	might	be	read	as	ei-
ther	a	formulation	of	SOM	or	an	unintentional	bequeathing	of	SOM	to	
the	rest	of	us.	At	the	beginning	of	Meditation	Two,	for	example,	when	
3.	 Buford	1970,	xii.	Buford’s	claim	overlooks	the	fact	that	Malebranche,	Leibniz,	
Berkeley,	Reid	and	even	Kant,	not	to	mention	Fichte	and	the	other	German	
Idealists,	all	reflect	explicitly	on	the	epistemological	problem	of	other	minds.	
Anita	Avramides’	recent	Other Minds	(2001)	is	helpful	on	a	number	of	points,	
but	it	excludes,	most	importantly,	Cordemoy.	Similarly,	the	“Other	Minds”	en-
try	in	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy	(available	at	http://plato.stan-
ford.edu/entries/other-minds/;	last	visited	March	2011)	leaves	out	a	number	
of	relevant	historical	figures.	
4.	 Although	 I	am	 focusing	here	on	 the	epistemological	problem,	Descartes	 is	
not	without	an	answer	to	the	conceptual	problem.	Roughly,	Descartes	would	
maintain	 that	 our	 knowledge	 of	 what	 we	 are	 as	 thinking	 things	 involves	
knowledge	of	a	primary	attribute	of	substance,	which	is,	by	its	nature,	a	prop-
erty	that	applies	to	minds	in	general	and	not	our	minds	in	particular.
5.	 For	example,	in	a	chapter	titled	simply	“Descartes	and	other	disasters”,	John	
Searle’s	 recent	 Mind: A Brief Introduction	 links	 Descartes	 to	 SOM	 (Searle	
2004,	Chapter	1).
mind.	In	sections	three	and	four,	I	supplement	this	claim	by	arguing	
that	 Descartes	 did	 not	 distinguish	 SOM	 from	 skepticism	 about	 the	
external	world	in	any	of	his	published	work.	In	particular,	in	section	
three,	 I	 show	 that	 SOM	 is	 not	 considered	 anywhere	 in	 the	Medita-
tions.	In	section	four,	I	present	an	interpretation	of	the	“language	test”	
from	the	Discourse on Method	(Discourse)	according	to	which	Descartes	
sought	only	to	 falsify	our	belief	 that	animals	have	souls	or	minds,	a	
view	prominent	among	his	scholastic	Aristotelian	contemporaries	as	
well	as	sixteenth-	and	seventeenth-century	innovators	like	Michel	de	
Montaigne	and	Pierre	Charron.2	This	leaves	us,	so	I	claim	in	section	
five,	with	Descartes’	correspondence	with	More.	I	argue	that	this	cor-
respondence,	which	contains	Descartes’	only	genuine	encounter	with	
SOM,	includes	an	explicit	appeal	to	a	common	“nature”	shared	by	all	
human	bodies	and	an	implicit	appeal	to	the	consistency	of	God’s	ac-
tivity	 in	 the	world.	From	 these	assumptions,	Descartes	 inferred	 that	
human	bodies	fit	to	be	joined	with	a	mind	always	have	been	and	al-
ways	will	be.	In	other	words,	given	what	he	tells	More,	Descartes	does	
not	have	the	right	conception	of	the	human	body,	as	described	in	sec-
tion	two,	for	SOM.	I	conclude	in	section	six	by	discussing	the	tension	
between	Descartes’	conception	of	 the	human	body	and	standard	ac-
counts	of	his	anti-Aristotelian	strategy	in	physics.
2. SOM: A brief history
There	are	a	variety	of	ways	to	demarcate	SOM.	I	am	interested	in	dis-
cussing	the epistemological problem,	and	I	will	proceed	on	the	assump-
tion	 that	 it	 is	 synonymous	with	SOM.	The	question	motivating	 this	
problem	relates	to	how	we	know	other	minds	exist:	What	justifies	our	
belief	that	a	given	body	has	a	mind	or	thinks?	It	is	this	version	of	the	
problem	of	other	minds	 for	which	we	have	 competing	historical	 ac-
counts.	One	finds,	for	example,	Thomas	Buford	introducing	an	anthol-
ogy	on	philosophical	issues	related	to	other	minds	with	the	suggestion	
2.	 See	 Desmond	 Clarke’s	 recent	 work	 for	 a	 comparison	 between	 Descartes’	
views	on	animal	souls	and	the	views	of	Montaigne	and	Charron	(Clarke	2003,	
72ff,	and	Clarke	2006,	334–335).
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The	 absence	 of	 such	 a	 proof	 troubled	 the	 first-generation	 Car-
tesian	Gerauld	 de	 Cordemoy.10	 In	 fact,	 Cordemoy	 became	 the	 first	
seventeenth-century	 figure,	 and	 perhaps	 the	 very	 first	 person	 ever,	
to	give	an	unambiguous	formulation	of	SOM.	Writing	eighteen	years	
after	Descartes’	 death,	Cordemoy	begins	 his	Discours Physique de la 
Parole (Discours):
Amongst	the	Bodies,	I	see	in	the	World,	I	perceive	some,	
that	 are	 in	 all	 things	 like	mine,	 and	 I	 confess,	 I	 have	 a	
great	inclination	to	believe,	that	they	are	united	to	minds,	
as	mine	 is.	But	when	 I	 come	 to	consider,	 that	my	Body	
hath	so	many	operations	distinct	from	those	of	my	mind,	
and	 that	 nothing	 of	what	maketh	 it	 subsist	 depends	 at	
all	from	Her,	I	think	I	have	at	least	ground	to	doubt,	that	
those	Bodies	are	united	to	minds,	until	 I	have	examin’d	
all	their	actions:	And	I	do	even	see	that	by	the	maxims	of	
good	sense	I	shall	be	obliged	to	believe,	that	they	have	no	
mind,	if	they	do	only	such	things,	whereof	I	have	found	in	
my	self	that	the	Body	alone	may	be	the	cause.11
Although	Cordemoy’s	monograph	provides	numerous	insights	into	the	
state	of	seventeenth-century	anthropology	and	linguistics,	its	opening	
paragraph	casts	it	as	a	sustained	attempt	to	answer	SOM.	Cordemoy	
develops	the	epistemological	problem	by	specifically	taking	for	grant-
ed	knowledge	of	his	own	mind	and	body	and	 then	finding	 “ground	
to	doubt”	that	other	“bodies	are	united	to	minds”.	As	an	interpreter	of	
10.	Cordemoy	 is	 little	discussed	 in	 the	English-speaking	world	apart	 from	 in-
frequent	references	to	his	atomism,	his	occasionalism	or	his	role	in	the	cor-
respondence	between	Leibniz	 and	Arnauld.	 See,	 however,	Ablondi	 2005	
for	some	of	the	broader	details	of	Cordemoy’s	life	and	natural	philosophy.	
Cordemoy’s	place	in	the	history	of	SOM	was	brought	to	my	attention	by	Van	
de	Pitte	1975	and	Gabbey	1990.
11.	 In	1668,	the	same	year	the	Discours was	published,	an	English	translation	ap-
peared	as	A Philosophical Discourse Concerning Speech, Conformable to the Carte-
sian Principles.	All	translations	are	taken	from	the	1668	English	translation	of	
the	Discours.	The	original	French	is	reproduced	in	Cordemoy	1968,	201–256.
reflecting	on	what	he	is	no	longer	convinced	exists,	Descartes’	medi-
tator	concedes	“that	there	is	absolutely	nothing	in	the	world,	no	sky,	
no	earth,	no minds,	no	bodies”.6	 Just	as	the	doubts	raised	in	Medita-
tion	One	threaten	our	pretense	to	know	the	world	on	the	basis	of	the	
testimony	of	 the	senses,	 they	also	render	doubtful	 the	existence	of	
minds	known	solely	on	the	testimony	of	the	senses.	The	meditator’s	
first	constructive	step	is	to	establish	that	his	own	mind	exists	without	
the	aid	of	the	senses—he	is	an	“I”,	that	is,	a	“thinking”	and	not	a	veridi-
cally	sensing	“thing”—yet	we	look	in	vain	in	the	subsequent	medita-
tions	 for	an	explicit	proof,	 let	alone	 for	evidence,	 that	other	minds	
exist.	 In	the	Second	Replies,	Descartes	even	acknowledges	that	“in	
my	Meditations…my	 supposition	was	 that	 no	 other	 human	 beings	
[homines]	were	yet	known	to	me”.7	Nevertheless,	Descartes	uses	the	
first-person	plural	a	number	of	times	after	Meditation	Two,	as	if	other	
human	beings	are	known	 to	him.8	Whatever	we	make	of	 this	 shift	
from	singular	 to	plural,	which	suggests,	at	 the	 least,	 that	Descartes	
was	not	attentive	to	SOM,	there	is	no	specific	proof	for	the	existence	
of	other	minds	in	the	Meditations.9
6.	 I	cite	Descartes	using	“AT”	to	refer	to	the	standard	original	language	edition	
of	Adam	and	Tannery,	followed	by	volume	and	pagination.	I	have	generally	
relied	on	the	Cambridge	translations	of	Descartes’	work,	which	include	the	
original	AT	references	in	the	margins.	The	Cambridge	translations	will	hence-
forth	be	referred	to	by	“CSM”	followed	by	volume	for	volumes	one	and	two	
and	by	“CSMK”	for	volume	three,	after	which	I	 include	the	pagination.	The	
passage	quoted	above	can	be	found	at	AT	VII	25,	CSM	II	16.	(Emphasis	added.)
7.	 AT	VII	142,	CSM	II	102.	This	remark	is	part	of	Descartes’	explanation	for	why	
he	is	seeking	objective	truth	and	not	merely	truth	“relative	to	human	beings”.
8.	 See,	for	example,	AT	VII	21,	30	and	32.
9.	 It	might	be	objected	 that	 the	proof	 for	 the	existence	of	God	 in	Meditation	
Three	 is	a	counterexample.	Perhaps	one	might	also	claim	that	 the	supposi-
tion	of	an	evil	genius	in	Meditation	One	never	actually	isolates	Descartes	in	
a	world	without	other	minds.	In	either	case,	however,	the	manner	in	which	
these	“other	minds”	are	introduced	or	known	to	exist	cannot	generalize.	The	
proof	for	the	existence	of	God	is	unique	to	God,	and	the	supposition	of	an	evil	
genius	is	about	denying	us	knowledge,	not	providing	it.
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In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 section,	 I	 will	 elaborate	 on	 the	 way	 in	
which	Cordemoy	presents	SOM	and	the	assumptions	that	he	made.	I	
then	ask	whether	Descartes	shared	Cordemoy’s	assumptions.	As	we	
will	see,	Descartes	and	his	follower	share	many	common	assumptions,	
but	while	Cordemoy	draws	on	 the	Meditations,	Descartes	makes	 ad-
ditional	claims	that	Cordemoy	fails	to	acknowledge.	In	particular,	Cor-
demoy	does	not	recognize	Descartes’	rejection	of	the	possibility	that	
a	human	body	without	a	mind	could	exist	in	the	natural	world.	This	
further	claim	by	Descartes	short-circuits	any	effort	to	motivate	SOM,	
as	we	will	see	in	later	sections.	Thus,	while	Descartes	and	Cordemoy	
share	some	of	the	necessary	assumptions	leading	to	SOM,	they	do	not	
share	the	assumption	that	the	human	body	has	a	contingent	relation-
ship	with	a	mind.
The	 most	 obvious	 assumption	 relevant	 to	 SOM	 is	 the	 privilege	
initially	 assigned	 to	 self-knowledge	 in	Meditation	 Two’s	 cogito argu-
ment.	In	the	nineteenth	century,	John	Stuart	Mill	argues	that	this	privi-
lege	leads	irrevocably	to	SOM.	Even	the	“most	strenuous	Intuitionist,”	
writes	Mill,	“does	not	include	this	[knowledge	of	other	minds]	among	
the	things	 that	 I	know	by	direct	 intuition.	 I	conclude…[other	minds	
exist]	from	certain	things,	which	my	experience	of	my	own	states	of	
feeling	proves	to	me	to	be	marks	of	it”.12	In	his	analysis	of	Descartes’	
relationship	to	SOM,	Gareth	Matthews	echoes	Mill’s	assessment	and	
likewise	 identifies	 this	privilege	as	 a	 condition	 for	SOM.	Lacking	 “a	
worry	 about	 how	 I	 can	 be	 justified	 in	 inferring	 that	 there	 are	 other	
minds	when	the	only	one	I	can	observe directly	is	my	own,”	insists	Mat-
thews,	“there	is	no	Problem	of	Other	Minds”.13
The	basic	 idea	shared	by	Mill	and	Matthews	is	both	simple	and	
entirely	justified.	To	generate	SOM,	there	must	exist	an	asymmetry	
between	the	ways	in	which	we	know	our	own	minds	exist—self-ev-
idently,	 intuitively	or	directly	 through	 introspection—and	 the	ways	
in	which	we	could	possibly	know	other	minds	exist—on	the	basis	of	
12.	 Mill	1865,	242.	See	also	Norman	Malcolm’s	famous	rebuke	of	Mill,	where	he	
calls	this	privilege	“the	most	fundamental	error”	Mill	makes	(Malcolm	1958,	74).	
13.	 Matthews	1986,	142	(emphasis	added).
Descartes,	he	is	noticing	that	a	proof	for	the	existence	of	other	minds	
would	seem	to	be	required	if	we	begin,	as	Descartes	clearly	does	 in	
Meditation	Two,	with	“no	sky,	no	earth,	no minds	[and]	no	bodies”	and	
then	prove	only	the	existence	of	bodies.
Countless	 of	 our	 beliefs	 lack	 a	 specific	 justification	 after	Medita-
tion	One,	however,	 so	 it	 is	worth	pausing	 to	consider	 the	oversight	
that	Cordemoy	identified.	Specifically,	why	does	Cordemoy	write	only	
about	our	belief	that	other	minds	exist?	What	makes	other	minds	wor-
thy	of	separate	treatment?	If	we	imagine	the	Meditations	as	a	guide	to	
how	we	justify	our	beliefs,	we	might	better	appreciate	the	question	I	
am	putting	 to	Cordemoy.	Like	a	work	of	mathematics	 that	 explains	
how	 to	perform	mathematical	proofs	but	 fails	 to	prove	 the	Pythago-
rean	Theorem,	Descartes’	Meditations explains	how	to	gain	knowledge	
but	fails	to	prove	that	other	minds	exist.	In	the	former	instance,	a	fail-
ure	to	prove	the	Pythagorean	Theorem	may	be	an	oversight	for	some-
one	interested	in	the	Pythagorean	Theorem,	but	it	is	hardly	a	flaw	in	
a	work	showing	how	to	perform	mathematical	proofs.	So	long	as	the	
explanation	of	how	to	produce	a	mathematical	proof	can	be	applied	
to	the	Pythagorean	Theorem,	the	work	has	accomplished	its	purpose.	
What	 prevents	 us	 from	 reaching	 the	 same	 conclusion	 about	 the	
omission	of	a	proof	for	the	existence	of	other	minds?	Descartes	does	
not	offer	a	specific	proof	for	the	existence	of	the	sky	or	the	earth—the	
other	things	listed	in	Meditation	Two—yet	this	is	not	a	major	lacuna	
in	 the	 text.	 It	 seems	 safe	 to	 conclude	 that	Cordemoy	must	 be	moti-
vated	by	the	absence	of	a	proof	and	the	further	belief	that	the	Medita-
tions does	not	equip	us	to	justify	our	belief	 in	the	existence	of	other	
minds.	In	other	words,	in	the	Discours, Cordemoy	proceeds	as	though	
Descartes’	claims	in	the	Meditations leave	us	with	a	distinctive	episte-
mological	problem	(as	to	whether	other	minds	exist)	that	cannot	be	
resolved	in	the	same	way	as	the	problem	of	the	external	world.	Minds	
are	 not	 comparable	 to	 the	 earth	 or	 the	 sky.	 The	 oversight	 that	Cor-
demoy	 identified	was	 that	 it	 is	 one	 thing	 to	 show	 that	 bodies	 exist	
but	something	else	to	show	that	minds	exist	attached	to	those	bodies.	
Descartes	equips	us	to	show	the	former	but	not	the	latter.
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existence	of	bodies	of	a	certain	kind	has	been	established	that	SOM	
gains	Cordemoy’s	attention.
This	 is	 no	more	 a	 historical	 accident	 than	 the	 privileging	 of	 self-
knowledge	 in	the	generation	of	SOM.	The	threat	of	modern	or	post-
Cartesian	skepticism	 is	 strongest	when	 it	unseats	our	best	claims	 to	
know.15	Such	is	the	case	with	the	explicit	doubts	raised	in	Descartes’	
Meditations.	For	instance,	they	do	not	stop	with	the	reliability	of	the	sens-
es	when	observing	objects	far	off	in	the	distance.	Instead,	the	doubts	of	
Meditation	One	undermine	the	senses	as	a	guide	to	truth	even	in	those	
situations	where	the	senses	are	used	to	correct	themselves:
Yet	although	the	senses	occasionally	deceive	us	with	re-
spect	 to	objects	which	are	very	small	or	 in	the	distance,	
there	are	many	other	beliefs	about	which	doubt	is	quite	
impossible,	even	though	they	are	derived	from	the	sens-
es—for	example,	that	I	am	here,	sitting	by	the	fire,	wear-
ing	a	winter	dressing-gown,	holding	this	piece	of	paper	in	
my	hands,	and	so	on.16
Offering	reasons	 to	doubt	 the	reliability	of	 the	senses	even	 in	cases	
like	these,	when	objects	are	right	in	front	of	us,	takes	skepticism	to	its	
logical	and,	in	the	case	of	modern	skepticism,	its	distinctive	extreme.	
Likewise,	skeptical	doubts	about	the	existence	of	other	minds	do	not	
target	 human	 bodies	 in	 the	 far-off	 distance	 or	 lifeless	 bodies	 lying	
dead	before	us.	Rather,	they	provide	reasons	to	doubt	that	the	living	
and	breathing	human	bodies	right	in	front	of	us	have	minds.	Short	of	
15.	 This	aspect	of	Descartes’	skepticism	is	emphasized	by	Harry	Frankfurt,	who	
notices	that	“the	perceptions	in	which	certainty	is	to	be	sought	[according	to	
Descartes]	will	be	those	of	an	ideally	qualified	perceiver	under	ideal	external	
conditions”	(Frankfurt	2008	[1970],	55).	Stanley	Cavell	emphasizes	the	same	
point	when	he	uses	 the	 label	 “best	 case	of	knowledge”	 to	describe	 the	 tar-
get	of	skeptical	doubt	(Cavell	1979,	129ff.).	For	discussion	of	the	similarities	
and	differences	between	Academic	and	Pyrrhonian	skepticism	as	compared	
to	Descartes’	 “modern	 skepticism”,	which	 uniquely	 calls	 into	 question	 our	
knowledge	of	the	external	world	in	a	completely	general	way,	see	Burnyeat	
1982;	cf.	Fine	2000	and	Broughton	2002,	90–92.
16.	 AT	VII	18,	CSM	II	12–13.
sense	 experience	 supplemented	with	 argument	 or	 inference	 or,	 in	
a	 word,	 indirectly.	 Cordemoy’s	 presentation	 of	 SOM	 assumes	 this	
asymmetry.	 He	 writes	 of	 what	 “I	 see”,	 “I	 perceive”	 and	 “I	 confess”,	
working	with	confidence	in	his	first-person	beliefs.	He	“consider[s]”	
what	he	knows	about	his	own	body	and	mind	and	concludes	that	he	
must	examine	“all…[the]	actions”	of	other	bodies	before	drawing	any	
conclusions	about	other	minds.	Put	 simply:	Cordemoy	knows	 that	
his	mind	is	united	to	his	body,	but	he	knows	this	in	a	way	that	jeop-
ardizes	his	knowledge	of	other	minds.	 If	 this	 is	all	Cordemoy	is	as-
suming	in	the	Discours, then	the	logic	of	the	Meditations implies	that	
SOM	could	arise	anytime	after	Descartes	privileges	self-knowledge	
in	Meditation	Two.
It	may	come	as	a	surprise,	then,	that	for	Cordemoy,	Meditation	Two	
does	not,	by	itself,	lead	to	SOM.	He	explicitly	envisioned	his	Discours 
as	akin	to	a	Meditation	Seven,	added	onto	Descartes’	original	six.	 “I	
proposed	 in	 the	 Six	 Discourses	 which	 preceded	 this,	 the	means	 to	
know	Ourselves,	&	made	it	manifest,	that	it	only	consisted	in	discern-
ing	in	us	the	Operations	of	the	Soul,	and	those	of	the	Body.	Now	I	pro-
pose	the	means	of	knowing	Others.”14	Another	discourse	was	needed	
because	dualism	and	the	return	of	the	external	world	still	left	the	exis-
tence	of	other	minds	unresolved.	But	while	Cordemoy	believed	Des-
cartes’	response	to	the	doubts	from	Meditation	One	was	incomplete,	
attention	to	what	he	says	here	and	in	the	opening	passage	of	the	Dis-
cours reveals	something	 less	obvious.	Cordemoy	believed	 that	SOM	
emerges	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 already-established	 existence	 of	 bod-
ies	“that	are	in	all	things	like	mine”.	It	is	these	bodies	whose	“actions”	
need	to	be	“examin’d”.	 In	other	words,	 it	 is	only	once	we	know	that	
the	external	world	exists	and	includes	other	bodies	like	our	own	that	
Cordemoy	asks	about	other	minds.	Thus,	while	 there	may	be	other	
assumptions	supporting	SOM—such	as	the	privilege	Descartes	gives	
to	self-knowledge	identified	by	Mill	and	Matthews—it	is	only	once	the	
14.	 Gerauld	de	Cordemoy	1668,	preface,	unpaginated.
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To	bring	this	point	out	more	clearly,	notice	that	 if	we	accept	that	
the	human	body	depends	on	or	otherwise	necessarily	involves	a	mind,	
then	questioning	the	existence	of	other	minds	is	tantamount	to	ques-
tioning	 the	 existence	 of	 human	bodies.	Additionally,	 it	 follows	 that	
finding	a	human	body	is	tantamount	to	finding	a	human	mind.19	For	
SOM	to	represent	a	self-standing	skeptical	challenge,	 these	 links	be-
tween	minds	and	human	bodies	must	be	broken.	What	is	needed	is	
the	possibility	that	there	are	living,	breathing	human	bodies	that,	for	
some	reason,	perhaps	even	a	reason	given	by	the	skeptic,	bear	a	con-
tingent	relation	to	minds.	As	Cordemoy	indicated,	it	is	this	possibility	
that	sets	the	framework	for	SOM:	“my	Body	hath	so	many	operations	
distinct	 from	those	of	my	mind,	and	that	nothing	of	what	maketh	 it	
subsist	depends	at	all	from	Her,	I	think	I	have	at	least	ground	to	doubt,	
that	 those	Bodies	are	united	 to	minds”.	 I	 conclude	 that	 for	SOM	we	
need	to	accept	that	what	we	perceive	is	not	a	living	human	body	with	
a	mind	but	a	mere human body.
It	may	seem	all	too	obvious	that	mere	human	bodies	exist,	but	real	
innovation	would	have	been	required	in	the	seventeenth	century	to	
make	such	a	claim.	Consider	 just	 the	case	of	 the	scholastic	Aristote-
lianism	that	dominated	in	educational	 institutions.	According	to	the	
hylomorphic	view	at	 the	 core	of	Aristotelian	philosophy,	 all	natural	
bodies	are	composites	of	matter	and	form.20	Shifts	toward	a	more	ro-
references	in	Christian	Wolff,	C.	M.	Pfaff	and	the	Encyclopédie	(for	more	on	
“egoism”,	see	McCracken	and	Tipton	2000,	178–79).	The	version	of	SOM	that	
arises	for	immaterialists	is	hard	to	distinguish	from	the	questions	those	who	
believe	in	immaterial	souls	communing	in	the	afterlife	must	confront.
19.	 As	I	will	show	in	the	sections	ahead,	it	is	this	latter	strategy	that	best	charac-
terizes	Descartes’	position	on	how	we	recognize	other	minds:	Where	there	
are	human	bodies,	 there	are	necessarily	human	minds.	And	what	makes	a	
human	body?	Descartes’	answer	in	the	context	of	SOM	is	that	it	must	be	pro-
duced	in	a	very	specific	way.
20.	The	centrality	of	hylomorphism	to	Aristotle’s	thought	is	well	documented,	but	
for	an	 introductory	account,	 see	Shields	2007,	49ff.	Discussion	of	hylomor-
phism	and	its	various	complications	in	the	medieval	period	can	be	found	in	
Pasnau	2010.	The	persistence	of	hylomorphism	and	the	modifications	made	
to	it	during	the	early	modern	period	are	described	in	the	essays	contained	in	
Manning	2012a.
doubting	what	we	know	in	these	circumstances,	the	skeptic	has	failed	
to	challenge	our	beliefs	about	other	minds,	because	she	has	failed	to	
cast	doubt	on	our	best	case	of	knowing.	In	other	words,	we	will	only	
have	arrived	at	a	modern	skeptical	version	of	SOM	if	we	have	ques-
tions	about	all	the	presumptive	justifications	for	believing	in	the	exis-
tence	of	other	minds,	including	our	justifications	for	believing	in	the	
mindedness	of	the	bodies	right	in	front	of	us.
The	moral	to	draw	from	this	last	claim	is	that	an	adequate	reconstruc-
tion	of	SOM’s	origins	in	the	seventeenth	century	must	be	tied	to	a	con-
ception	of	the	human	body	as	a	functioning	living	thing,	the	existence	
of	which	neither	depends	on	nor	necessarily	 implicates	the	existence	
of	a	mind.17	Put	simply,	it	is	as	important	to	have	the	right	conception	
of	the	human	body	to	account	for	the	emergence	of	SOM	in	the	seven-
teenth	century	as	it	is	to	have	the	right	conception	of	the	mind.18
17.	 The	subsequent	history	of	SOM	confirms	 this	 fact.	 In	Mill’s	 formulation	of	
SOM,	he	asks,	by	“what	evidence	do	I	know,	or	by	what	considerations	am	I	
led	to	believe,	that	there	exist	other	sentient	creatures;	that	the	walking	and	
speaking	figures	which	I	see	and	hear,	have	sensations	and	thoughts,	or	in	
other	words,	possess	Minds?”	(Mill	1865,	243).	Mill	is	also	interested	in	only	
certain	bodies,	and	I	believe	he	means	living	human	bodies	that	are,	 in	all	
respects,	fully	functioning.	
	 	 We	can	draw	a	similar	conclusion	 from	Bertrand	Russell’s	appeal	 to	 the	
argument	from	analogy:
	 	 We	 observe	 in	 ourselves	 such	 occurrences	 as	 remembering,	 rea-
soning,	 feeling	 pleasure,	 and	 feeling	 pain.	 We	 think	 that	 sticks	
and	 stones	 do	 not	 have	 these	 experiences,	 but	 that	 other	 peo-
ple	 do….It	 is	 clear	 that	 belief	 in	 the	 minds	 of	 others	 requires…
something	 that	 may	 be	 vaguely	 called	 “analogy.”	 The	 behavior	
of	 other	 people	 is	 in	many	 ways	 analogous	 to	 our	 own,	 and	 we	
suppose	 that	 it	 must	 have	 analogous	 causes.	 What	 people	 say	
is	what	we	 should	 say	 if	we	had	a	 certain	 thought,	 and	 so	we	 in-
fer	 that	 they	 probably	 have	 these	 thoughts.	 (Russell	 1948,	 433)
	 Beginning	with	other	“people”,	Russell’s	conception	of	human	bodies	display-
ing	behavior,	though	not	necessarily	mindedness,	motivates	SOM.	For	a	de-
tailed	discussion	of	the	need	for	a	specific	conception	of	the	body	in	order	to	
generate	the	problem	of	other	minds,	see	Long	1964.	
18.	 I	refrain	from	arguing	that	this	is	a	condition	for	the	general	possibility	of	SOM,	
because	later	in	the	eighteenth	century	SOM	was	recast	without	reference	to	
bodies.	Specifically,	“egoism”	came	to	be	identified	with	SOM,	testified	to	by	
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In	the	specific	case	of	living	bodies,	of	which	the	human	body	is	just	
one	example,	scholastic	Aristotelians	identified	forms	with	souls—the	
Latin	 for	 “soul”	 is	anima,	 from	which	the	English	“animated”	derives.	
Souls,	in	turn,	were	differentiated	from	one	another	according	to	the	
functions	 they	 introduced	 into	matter.	So,	 for	example,	a	vegetative	
soul	is	the	form	of	a	body	that	can	grow	and	take	in	nutrition.	Plants	
have	vegetative	souls.	Animals	that	move	and	interact	with	the	world	
through	sense	experience	have	motive	or	sensitive	souls.	Human	be-
ings,	who	can	contemplate	universals,	have	 rational	 souls	or	minds.	
Thus,	roughly	speaking,	whereas	plants	have	one	kind	of	soul	inform-
ing	their	matter	according	to	the	scholastic	Aristotelian,	animals	have	
another	kind	of	soul	that	includes	the	functions	of	the	vegetative	soul,	
and	humans	have	yet	another	kind	of	soul	that	includes	the	functions	
of	 the	other	two.	 In	each	case,	 it	would	be	wrong	to	simply	 identity	
the	soul	with	matter	but	it	would	also	be	wrong	to	believe	that	living	
plants,	animals	or	human	bodies	exist	without	their	appropriate	souls.
The	Aristotelian	tradition’s	conception	of	a	living	body	is	clearly	hos-
tile	to	the	possibility	that	there	could	exist	what	I	dubbed	earlier	“a	mere	
human	body”—or	really	any	mere	body,	if	that	means	a	body	without	a	
form.	Just	as	the	human	body’s	matter	depends	on	our	soul,	so	too	does	
our	 soul	 depend	on	our	 body’s	matter.23	With	 living	 things	 generally,	
this	means	that	the	soul	cannot	be	active	or	present	unless	the	matter	is	
structured	or	organized	in	the	right	way.	In	a	living	human	body,	all	the	
material	conditions	necessary	for	the	operation	of	a	rational	soul	will	be	
present.	When	these	material	conditions	are	present,	the	rational	soul	
corpse	is	a	body	no	longer	fit	to	have	such	a	form.	Further	discussion	of	Des-
cartes’	views	on	embryology	appears	below	in	section	five	and	in	note	61.
23.	 Although	the	rational	or	intellectual	soul	is	unique	in	not	requiring	a	specific	
organ,	according	to	scholastics	like	Aquinas,	it	would	still	not	be	able	to	exist	
in	its	natural	state—that	is,	in	union	with	matter	as	the	soul	of	a	human	being—
without	some	dependence	on	matter.	The	thorny	issue	of	Christian	immortal-
ity	is	in	the	background	here	for	scholastics,	as	is	the	pressing	interpretative	
question	of	whether	or	not	the	soul	is	studied	by	the	metaphysician	or	the	
natural	philosopher.	For	discussion,	see	Pasnau	2002,	45ff.;	Pasnau	2007;	and	
Bakker	2007.	For	how	these	issues	impact	our	interpretation	of	Descartes,	see	
Manning	(forthcoming).
bust	ontological	dualism	in	scholastic	accounts	of	matter	and	form	can	
be	detected	in	the	sixteenth	and	seventeenth	centuries—and	there	are	
highly	technical	complications	introduced	if	we	consider	Thomist	and	
Scotist	disputes	over	the	existence	of	prime	matter	and	the	plurality	
of	forms—yet	the	view	that	matter	and	form	are	not	separate	entities	
but	elements	of	a	single	whole,	distinguishable	by	conceptual	analysis	
alone,	was	the	norm.21	This	means	that	matter	and	form	will	be	pres-
ent	in	any	natural	or	artificial	body,	whether	it	be	a	rock;	a	chair;	or	
even	the	embryo,	the	fully	functioning	human	body	or	the	body	of	a	
corpse.22	To	be	a	body	of	any	kind	was	to	be	a	matter-form	composite.
21.	 Alternative	views	of	matter	and	form	among	the	Scholastics	are	detailed	in	
Ariew	1998.
22.	An	anonymous	 referee	pointed	out	 that	 in	 the	 initial	version	of	 this	paper	
there	were	two	claims	that	needed	to	be	considered	more	explicitly:	first,	the	
claim	that	a	living	human	body	has	a	form	and,	second,	the	claim	that	a	hu-
man	corpse	has	a	form.	Since	receiving	the	referee’s	comments,	it	occurred	
to	me	that	to	be	complete,	this	paper	needs	to	consider	a	third	claim	as	well:	
that	the	human	embryo	must	have	a	form.	The	referee’s	question	was:	Given	
these	separate	claims,	which	does	Descartes	reject?	That	is,	does	Descartes	
reject	that	(1)	the	living	human	body	has	an	Aristotelian	scholastic	form,	(2)	
the	human	embryo	has	an	Aristotelian	scholastic	 form	and,	(3)	 the	human	
corpse	 has	 an	Aristotelian	 scholastic	 form?	Descartes’	 substance-mode	 on-
tology	 is	 purposefully	 hostile	 to	 his	 predecessors’	 use	 of	matter	 and	 form,	
which	implies	he	rejects	(1)–(3),	yet,	in	a	number	of	places,	Descartes	refers	
to	the	human	soul	as	an	element	in	a	“substantial	union”	with	the	body	or	
as	a	 “substantial	 form”	(e. g.,	AT	VII	228,	CSM	II	160	and	AT	III	505,	CSMK	
208;	for	discussion	of	Descartes’	rejection	of	scholastic	Aristotelian	forms,	see	
Garber	1992,	94–116;	Des	Chene	1998;	Pasnau	2004;	and	especially	Hattab	
2009).	There	remains	a	heated	scholarly	discussion	about	how	to	interpret	
Descartes’	use	of	“form”	in	connection	with	the	souls	of	human	beings—for	
more	on	which,	see	note	71	below—but	I	provide	evidence	in	section	five	that	
Descartes	does	not	reject	(1)	but	rather	accepts	something	very	much	like	it,	
because	he	rejects	the	natural	existence	of	a	“mere	human	body”.	What	about	
(2)	and	(3)?	This	question	is	complicated	by	Descartes’	promiscuous	use	of	
“substance”	to	refer	to	the	particular	bodies	studied	by	the	physicist,	a	fact	that	
obscures	 the	ontological	status	of	particular	bodies	without	 forms,	which	 I	
would	argue	are	not	substances	strictly	speaking	(for	discussion	of	the	onto-
logical	status	of	particular	bodies	that	lack	substantial	forms,	see	Slowik	2001,	
Sowall	2004,	Normore	2009,	Hatfield	2009	and	Manning	2012b).	 I	 cannot	
give	 this	question	 its	 full	due,	but,	 roughly,	 I	would	 claim	 that	 the	human	
embryo	is	not	a	living	human body, strictly	speaking,	and	neither	is	the	human	
corpse	(cf.	AT	XI	330–331,	CSM	I	329–330).	The	embryo	is	a	body	that	is	not	
yet	fit	to	receive	the	only	form	remaining	in	Descartes’	philosophy,	and	the	
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entire	corpus	that	appear	relevant	 to	SOM.	A	number	of	commenta-
tors	have	worked	 these	passages	over,	using	 them	to	do	everything	
from	identifying	an	answer	to	the	other-minds	skeptic	to	supporting	
the	claim	that	Descartes	recognized	and	invented	the	problem.	I	will	
be	using	these	passages	once	more,	but	this	time	to	support	the	claim	
that	Descartes	never	considered	SOM	of	his	own	accord.26	More	than	
mere	 blindness	 to	 what	 you	 may	 still	 think	 an	 inevitable	 problem,	
however,	Descartes	had	good	reason	to	limit	his	attention	to	the	skep-
tical	problem	of	 the	external	world,	because	 the	same	strategies	 for	
acquiring	knowledge	 in	 that	case	apply	 in	every	other	context.	This	
section	builds	to	this	conclusion	by	examining	Descartes’	correspon-
dence	 and	especially	 the	Meditations	more	 closely.	The	next	 section	
examines	Descartes’	Discourse and	 the	potential	 role	 of	 language	 in	
assessing	who	does	and	does	not	have	a	mind.	Once	making	clear	that	
Descartes	never	considered	SOM	in	any	of	his	published	works,	I	turn,	
in	section	five,	to	his	actual	response	to	SOM.
In	a	 late	 letter	 to	Henry	More,	Descartes	made	his	most	explicit	
claim	about	our	access	to	the	minds	of	others.	The	subject	under	dis-
cussion	was	the	attributes	a	corporeal	substance	must	have	in	order	
to	 exist.	Opposing	Descartes’	 view	 from	 the	Principles of Philosophy 
(Principles)	that	the	primary	attribute	of	extension	alone	secures	the	
existence	of	corporeal	substance,	More	suggested	that	“some	proper-
ties	are	prior	to	others	/	proprietates alias alijs esse priores”.27	In	particular,	
as	 Descartes	 summarized	 his	 correspondent’s	 views,	More	 claimed	
26.	Frederick	Copleston	is	right	 that	“neither	 in	the	Meditations	nor	 in	the	Prin-
ciples of Philosophy	 does…[Descartes]	 treat	 specifically	 the	 problem	 of	 our	
knowledge	of	 the	existence	of	other	minds”.	Copleston	adds	 that	 “if	 called	
up,	[Descartes]	would	doubtless	produce	an…argument…[appealing]	to	the	
divine	veracity,	 to	existence,	 [to]	 the	existence	of	other	minds”	 (Copleston	
1960,	Volume	4,	117).	Anita	Avramides	also	recognizes	 that	Descartes	does	
not	consider	SOM.	Her	reconstruction	of	what	Descartes’	response	to	SOM	
might	have	been	appears	in	Avramides	2001,	59ff.	Avramides	does	not	cite	
the	texts	I	discuss	below	in	section	five,	however,	which	renders	her	account	
more	speculative	than	it	needed	to	be.	I	am	unsure	if	she	would	accept	the	
reconstruction	I	offer	beyond	section	three.
27.	 AT	V	299.
must	also	be	present.	Any	other	view	 is	 an	anathema	 to	Aristotelian	
hylomorphism.	As	 a	 result,	 scholastic	Aristotelianism	denies	 the	 pos-
sibility	of	a	mere	human	body	and	immunizes	itself	from	SOM.24
Cordemoy	 appears	 to	 have	 believed	 that	 Descartes’	 Meditations 
and	the	physics	that	it	supports	deliver	the	innovation	necessary	to	ac-
cept	that	a	mere	human	body	may	exist.	Specifically,	in	Meditation	Six,	
once	the	real	distinction	between	mind	and	body	is	established	such	
that	minds	and	bodies	can	exist	separate	from	one	another,	it	is	an	easy	
step	to	the	possible	existence	of	mere	human	bodies.25	This	explains	
why	Cordemoy	wrote	a	Seventh	Discourse	 in	the	Discours,	a	prover-
bial	Meditation	Seven.	It	also	explains	why	considerations	about	the	
nature	of	the	mind	and	subjectivity	alone	did	not	create	a	conscious	
recognition	of	SOM	in	the	seventeenth	century	or	before.	Yet,	as	I	will	
go	on	 to	argue,	 in	 spite	of	privileging	 self-knowledge	 in	Meditation	
Two	and	in	spite	of	advocating	the	real	distinction	between	mind	and	
body	in	Meditation	Six,	Descartes	several	times	refrains	from	describ-
ing	the	living	human	body	as	a	body	that	exists	without	a	mind.	Thus,	
contrary	to	how	Cordemoy	understands	Descartes’	position,	Descartes	
does	not	accept	the	existence	of	mere	human	bodies,	and	Descartes	
had	good	reason	not	to	engage	with	SOM.	In	sections	three	and	four,	
I	support	this	claim	by	explaining	away	those	texts	where	Descartes	
appears	to	be	actively	considering	SOM.
3. No SOM in Descartes’ Meditations
Beyond	the	two	sentences	already	cited	from	the	Meditations and	the	
Objections and Replies,	there	are	only	a	handful	of	passages	in	Descartes’	
24.	 For	more	on	Aristotle	and	SOM,	see	the	concluding	pages	of	Sorabji	1974.
25.	 In	fact,	there	is	an	additional	premise	needed	to	make	this	transition.	Specifi-
cally,	one	needs	a	monistic	account	of	life	in	terms	of	extended	matter—i. e.,	
a	mechanical	account	of	life.	This	is	precisely	what	Platonic	dualism	lacked	
and	may	explain	the	emergence	of	SOM	only	in	the	seventeenth	century	(cf.	
Tsouna	1998	for	discussion	of	ancient	philosophers’	views	regarding	SOM).	
In	any	case,	once	mind	and	body	can	exist	separate	from	one	another	and	ma-
terial	explanations	exist	for	living	functions,	then	mere	human	bodies	look	to	
be	a	real	possibility.
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Indeed,	the	analogy	implies	that	knowing	about	the	existence	of	other	
minds	faces	no	obstacles	distinct	from	those	related	to	knowing	that	
subvisible	bodies	exist.	We	are	not	immediately	aware	of	either	sub-
visible	particles	or	other	minds,	yet	to	Descartes	this	does	not	register	
as	a	skeptical	problem.	To	the	contrary,	what	his	remark	to	More	indi-
cates,	quite	innocently,	 is	that	we	cannot	imagine	having	immediate	
access	to	other	minds	because	the	fact	that	they	are	other	minds	just	
means	 that	 they	 are	not	 immediately	 available	 to	us.	 It	 is	 the	 same	
with	subvisible	particles.	The	whole	point	of	Descartes’	 response	 to	
More	is	that	the	existence	of	these	things	and	our	knowledge	of	their	
attributes	has	nothing	to	do	with	their	being	immediately	perceivable.
But	then	how	do	we	know	subvisible	particles	or	other	minds	ex-
ist	 if	 they	are	not	immediately	perceivable?	The	answer	will	have	to	
be	that	we	infer	their	existence,	and,	in	fact,	this	is	Descartes’	answer	
whenever	 the	 existence	 of	 anything	 is	 in	 question	 besides	 the	 exis-
tence	of	the	“I”	and	“God”,	both	of	which	can	be	known	to	exist	without	
the	need	 for	an	 inference.	Descartes	does	not	say	any	of	 this	 in	 the	
passage	addressed	to	More.	But	in	a	sequence	of	passages	related	to	
the	famous	wax	example	from	Meditation	Two,	he	begins	to	give	pre-
cisely	this	answer.	Descartes	even	seems	to	draw	an	analogy	to	other	
minds	when	emphasizing	that	we	do	not	ordinarily	“see”	the	truth	of	
anything	with	the	senses	alone.	He	writes:	
We	say	that	we	see	the	wax	itself,	if	it	is	there	before	us,	
not	that	we	judge	it	to	be	there	from	its	colour	or	shape;	
and	 this	might	 lead	me	 to	 conclude	without	more	 ado	
that	 knowledge	 of	 the	 wax	 comes	 from	 what	 the	 eye	
sees,	 and	not	 from	 the	 scrutiny	of	 the	mind	alone.	But	
then	 if	 I	 look	out	of	 the	window	and	see	men	crossing	
the	square,	as	I	happen	to	have	done,	I	normally	say	that	
I	see	the	men	themselves,	just	as	I	say	that	I	see	the	wax.	
Yet	do	I	see	any	more	than	hats	and	coats	which	could	
conceal	 automatons.	 I	 judge	 that	 they	 are	men.	And	 so	
something	which	I	thought	I	was	seeing	with	my	eyes	is	
that	“being	perceivable	by	the	senses”	comes	before	extension.28	Des-
cartes	 responds	 by	 encouraging	 More	 to	 consider	 whether	 “being	
perceivable”	could	ever	be	anything	but	an	“extrinsic	denomination	/	
denominatio extrinseca”.	With	this	technical	term	of	scholastic	Aristote-
lian	logic,	all	Descartes	is	saying	is	that	whether	a	given	substance	is	
perceived	is	a	fact	about	perceivers.	It	is	not	a	fact	about	the	substance	
itself.	In	other	words,	Descartes	is	pointing	out	that	“being	perceivable”	
is	a	relational	property	and	as	such	it	should	not	be	thought	an	essen-
tial	property	of	corporeal	substance.	
For	good	measure,	Descartes	adds	that	“being	perceivable”	could	
never	 be	 an	 attribute	 of	 the	 subvisible	 bodies	 that	 we	 know	 to	 ex-
ist,	because	“sensory	nerves	so	fine	that	they	could	be	moved	by	the	
smallest	particles	of	matter	are	no	more	intelligible	to	me	than	a	fac-
ulty	enabling	our	mind	to	sense	or	perceive	other	minds	immediately	
[immediatè]”.29	The	fact	that	we	have	no	difficulty	recognizing	that	such	
bodies	exist,	however,	even	though	they	are	not	perceivable,	is	meant	
to	 tip	 the	 scales	 in	Descartes’	 favor.	More	 is	 supposed	 to	agree	 that	
subvisible	bodies	exist	and	are	extended	and	that	qualifying	their	ex-
istence	or	our	conception	of	 them	by	citing	the	need	for	 “being	per-
ceivable”	denies	what	we	otherwise	understand	quite	clearly—that,	as	
bodies,	they	need	only	to	be	extended	to	exist.
So	much	for	the	topic	under	discussion	with	More.	But	what	should	
we	make	of	Descartes’	 analogy	between	our	knowledge	of	 the	exis-
tence	of	subvisible	particles	and	our	knowledge	of	other	minds?	Does	
our	lack	of	a	faculty	comparable	to	sight—which	is	going	proxy	for	per-
ception	of	corporeal	substance	in	the	exchange	with	More—imply	that	
the	existence	of	other	minds	is	somehow	doubtful?30	The	answer	is	no.	
28.	AT	V	341,	CSMK	372.
29.	AT	V	341,	CSMK	372;	modified.
30.	Descartes	 sometimes	claims	 that	 the	particular	 configurations	of	 impercep-
tible	matter	cannot	be	known	with	absolute	certainty	(e. g.,	AT	VIIIB	327,	CSM	
I	289).	To	this	extent,	our	lack	of	direct	perception	may	look	to	be	a	handicap.	
Something	similar	applies	to	the	case	of	other	minds.	Although	we	know	that	
such	minds	exist,	our	lack	of	direct	perception	entails	that	we	do	not	always	
know	what	someone	else	is	thinking.
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just	such	an	account	in	Meditation	Three,	with	the	derivation	of	the	
“general	rule”	that	we	can	trust	our	clear	and	distinct	perceptions.33	This	
claim	is	carried	further	in	Meditation	Four,	where	the	intellect	and	will	
are	described	as	the	two	elements	or	“concurrent	causes”	in	judgment.	
We	learn	there	that	our	errors	“depend	on	both	the	intellect	and	the	
will	simultaneously”.	Specifically,	“all	that	the	intellect	does	is	to	enable	
me	to	perceive	the	ideas	which	are	subjects	for	possible	judgments”.34 
By	 contrast,	 the	will	 “simply	 consists	 in	 our	 ability	 to	 do	 or	 not	 do	
something….It	consists	simply	in	the	fact	that	when	the	intellect	puts	
something	forward	for	affirmation	or	denial”,	no	external	force	makes	
us	affirm	or	deny	the	content	before	us.35	The	purpose	of	the	theodicy	
in	Meditation	Four	is	to	show	that	it	is	within	our	power	to	coordinate	
the	 two	 elements	 of	 judgment	 so	 as	 to	 avoid	 error.	We	 are	 respon-
sible	for	our	erroneous	beliefs,	because	we	should	affirm	only	those	
of	our	ideas	we	cannot	help	but	immediately	judge	to	be	true,	which	
are	none	other	than	our	clear	and	distinct	perceptions.	In	other	words,	
while	all	knowledge	will	involve	judgment,	there	are	some	ideas	that	
we	immediately	affirm	and	others	that	are	mediately	affirmed	after	ar-
gument	and	inferences	from	clear	and	distinct	perceptions.
Descartes’	one-size-fits-all	strategy	for	securing	knowledge	gave	
him	 good	 reason	 not	 to	 do	what	we	 saw	Cordemoy	 doing	 in	 sec-
tion	 two—namely,	 offer	 a	 specific	 response	 to	SOM.	For	Descartes,	
the	 important	 distinction	 among	 our	 various	 knowledge	 claims	 is	
drawn	between	those	that	we	can	know	immediately—the	“I”	(Medi-
tation	Two)	and	“God”	(Meditation	Five)—and	everything	else,	which	
requires	an	 inference.	The	existence	of	a	piece	of	wax	 is	 something	
we	must	 infer.	 So,	 too,	 an	 inference	was	 required	 to	 know	 that	 the	
figures	we	see	in	the	distance	are	genuine	human	beings.	Recall	that,	
for	Cordemoy,	the	implicit	justification	for	a	further	meditation	after	
Meditation	Six	is	that	SOM	poses	a	unique	challenge	distinct	from	the	
33.	 AT	VII	35,	CSM	II	24.
34.	AT	VII	56,	CSM	II	39.
35.	 AT	VII	57,	CSM	II	40.
in	fact	grasped	solely	by	the	faculty	of	judgment	which	is	
in	my	mind.31 
Just	 as	 the	 “scrutiny	of	 the	mind”	 and	 the	 “faculty	of	 judgment”	 are	
needed	to	know	the	“wax	itself”,	which	some	claim	the	“eye	sees”,	the	
“scrutiny	of	the	mind”	is	needed	to	know	that	what	we	“see”	from	our	
window	are	men	and	not	automatons.	Descartes	is	not	suggesting	that	
seeing	men,	and	therefore	bodies	with	minds,	requires	a	special	kind	
of	judgment	or	inference	on	our	part.	There	is	not	a	distinctive	episte-
mological	problem	here	that	might	support	Cordemoy’s	efforts	in	the	
Discours.	 Instead,	 as	Gareth	Matthews	 tells	 us	when	 explaining	 this	
passage	from	Meditation	Two,	to	“get	the	problem	of	other	minds	go-
ing	[here],	one	would	need	to	introduce	the	suggestion	that,	even	if	
we	went	down	into	the	street	and	disrobed	those	figures,	we	could	not	
rule	out”	that	they	were	machines.32	Or,	as	I	labored	to	put	the	point	in	
Section	Two,	only	if	the	living,	functioning	human	bodies	right	in	front	
of	us	bear	a	contingent	relation	to	minds	could	 this	passage	deliver	
us	into	SOM.	What	the	“hats	and	coats”	passage	illustrates	is	that	we	
deploy	the	powers	of	the	mind	in	judging	and	inferring	what	we	oth-
erwise	still	freely	describe	as	“seeing”,	even	though	“seeing”	is	never	
a	matter	of	simple	and	immediate	visual	perception.	Thus,	in	answer	
to	the	question	that	initially	led	us	back	to	Mediation	Two,	we	know	
subvisible	bodies	and	other	minds	exist	 in	precisely	 the	same	way—
through	a	judgment	or	inference.	This	is	the	point	of	the	wax	example	
itself:	even	in	what	appears	the	simplest	case	of	knowing—that	I	see	
this	piece	of	wax—the	senses	play	a	relatively	minor	role	as	compared	
to	our	“faculty	of	judgment”.
Accepting	 that	 the	 senses	by	 themselves	do	not	 justify	 claims	 to	
immediately	know	anything,	 the	Meditations still	owe	us	an	account	
of	how	to	effectively	exercise	our	judgment	so	as	to	avoid	false	beliefs	
about	 things	 like	pieces	of	wax	and	other	minds.	Descartes	delivers	
31.	 AT	VII	32,	CSM	II	21.
32.	Matthews	1986,	142.
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really	is	a	world,	and	that	human	beings	have	bodies	and	
so	on—since	no	sane	person	has	ever	seriously	doubted	
these	things.	The	point	is	that	in	considering	these	argu-
ments	we	come	to	realize	that	they	are	not	as	solid	or	as	
transparent	[perspicaus]	as	 the	arguments	which	 lead	us	
to	knowledge	of	our	own	minds	and	of	God,	so	that	the	
latter	are	the	most	certain	and	evident	of	all possible objects 
of knowledge	for	the	human	intellect.38
“[O]ur	own	minds”	and	“God”	are	privileged	instances	of	knowledge.	
Everything	else,	the	“and	so	on”	referred	to	among	“all	possible	objects	
of	knowledge”,	 is	classed	together	and	separate	 from	the	privileged	
class.	 But	Descartes	does	not	mean	 to	 imply	 that	 these	 lesser	 “pos-
sible	objects	of	 knowledge”	 cannot	be	proven	or	 established.	They	
can	be,	 and	Meditation	Six	 illustrates	how.	 For	Descartes,	 the	way	
in	which	we	come	to	know	the	external	world	exists	is	emblematic	
of	how	we	come	to	know	everything	outside	of	the	privileged	class.	
Cordemoy	believed	otherwise.	For	Cordemoy,	the	knowledge	that	a	
human	body	exists	was,	at	most,	defeasible	evidence	for	the	further	
judgment	that	other	minds	exist.	This,	however,	is	a	claim	that	Des-
cartes	implicitly	and	explicitly	rejects,	as	we	will	see	in	sections	four	
and	five	below.
To	sum	up	my	claims	 to	 this	point:	 I	have	argued	both	 that	Des-
cartes	does	not	consider	SOM	in	the	Meditations	and	that	there	is	no	
pressing	need	 that	he	 should.	Further,	 I	have	argued	 that	Descartes	
has	reason	to	think	SOM	poses	no	special	problem	distinct	from	the	
problem	of	the	external	world.	But	to	many	of	Descartes’	readers,	part	
five	of	the	Discourse	suggests	a	different	story.	In	particular,	passing	the	
so-called	“language	test”	is	often	read	as	an	answer	to	SOM.	This	was	
Cordemoy’s	view,	but	in	the	next	section,	I	will	show	that	answering	
the	skeptic	was	not	among	Descartes’	goals	in	the	Discourse and	that	
no	answer	to	SOM	is	to	be	found	there.	
38.	AT	VII	15–16,	CSM	II	11;	emphasis	added.
problem	of	the	external	world.	According	to	Cordemoy,	we	can	stop	
at	our	knowledge	that	bodies	exist	and	then	ask	whether	those	bodies	
have	minds.	Descartes’	position,	however,	is	that,	with	the	sole	excep-
tion	of	our	knowledge	of	ourselves	and	God’s	necessary	existence,	we	
are	always	inferring	or	drawing	on	implicit	arguments	whenever	we	
move	beyond	our	own	ideas.	As	a	result,	there	is	not	a	distinctive	epis-
temological	problem	of	other	minds,	because	affirming	only	our	clear	
and	distinct	perceptions	provides	us	everything	we	need	for	resolving	
the	epistemic	difficulties	with	which	we	may	find	ourselves.	The	man-
ner	in	which	we	come	to	know	that	there	are	other	minds	is	the	same	
manner	in	which	we	come	to	know	that	the	external	world	exists	and	
that	this	is	a	piece	of	wax.36
Descartes	stipulates	to	this	conclusion	when	he	reflects	on	his	own	
epistemological	success. In	the	Synopsis	to	the	Meditations,	which	he	
wrote	after	finishing	the	rest	of	the	work,	Descartes	emphasized	that	
his	main	accomplishment	was	not	his	response	to	the	skeptic.	Instead,	
it	was	the	division	implied	between,	on	the	one	hand,	knowledge	that	
the	self	and	God	exist	and,	on	the	other	hand,	knowledge	that	anything	
else	exists.	The	former	are	known	to	exist	directly	or	immediately	be-
cause	they	are	instances	of	clear	and	distinct	perception.	Knowledge	
that	anything	else	exists	calls	for	premises	and	an	inference	to	a	con-
clusion.	Referring	specifically	to	the	results	of	Meditation	Six,	where	
he	finally	infers	the	existence	of	“material	things”,	Descartes	claimed	
to	produce	“all	the	arguments	from	which	we	may	infer	[possit concludi] 
the	existence	of	material	things”.37	Yet,	he	continued:
[The]	great	benefit	of	these	arguments	is	not,	in	my	view,	
that	 they	prove	what	 they	 establish—namely	 that	 there	
36.	The	fact	that	we	must	make	an	inference	in	both	cases	does	not	mean	the	two	
judgments	are	exactly	 the	same.	The	only	basis	on	which	such	 judgments	
could	be	made	 for	Descartes,	however,	 is	 either	practiced	 introspection	or	
sensory	 experience.	 Both	 are	 parasitic	 on	 our	 own	 ideas,	 and	 both	 are	 in-
volved	in	our	knowledge	of	the	external	world	and	other	minds.	This	robs	
SOM	of	its	uniqueness.	Fred	Dretske	makes	precisely	the	same	point	in	his	
effort	to	“demote”	the	problem	of	other	minds	in	Dretske	1973.
37.	 AT	VII	15,	CSM	II	11;	modified.
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falsify	the	belief	that	beasts	(and	machines)	have	minds	and	genuine	
intelligence.	Thus,	the	target	of	the	Discourse is	not	the	skeptic	about	
the	existence	of	other	minds	but	the	overly	credulous	who	accept	that	
living	 things	besides	human	beings	have	minds	or	 separate	 souls.41 
Unless	the	subsequent	passages	from	the	Discourse	suggest	otherwise,	
all	we	should	expect	to	find	is:	(1)	a	clarification	of	the	limits	of	ma-
chine	intelligence	that	will	allow	us	to	conclude	that	(2)	we	are	in	the	
presence	of	a	mere	machine.
The	Discourse proceeds	to	offer	two	“means	of	recognizing”	a	mind-
less	machine.	First	comes	the	“language	test”:	
We	 can	 certainly	 conceive	of	 a	machine	 so	 constructed	
that	 it	utters	words,	and	even	utters	words	which	corre-
spond	 to	 bodily	 actions	 causing	 a	 change	 in	 its	 organs	
(e. g.	if	you	touch	it	in	one	spot	it	asks	what	you	want	of	it,	
if	you	touch	it	in	another	it	cries	out	that	you	are	hurting	it,	
and	so	on).	But	it	is	not	conceivable	that	such	a	machine	
should	produce	different	arrangements	of	words	so	as	to	
give	an	appropriately	meaningful	answer	to	whatever	is	
said	in	its	presence,	as	the	dullest	of	men	can	do.42
Reminiscent	of	the	Turing	Test—though	with	the	very	different	focus	of	
determining	who	does	not	have	a	mind—here	the	machine	under	con-
sideration	simulates	our	appearance	and	behavior	so	exactly	that	not	
only	does	it	look	like	us,	it	sounds	like	us	and	it	even	responds	to	exter-
nal	stimuli	in	the	same	way.43	But,	says	Descartes,	the	latter	is	possible	
41.	 We	saw	in	the	last	section	that	the	Aristotelian	scholastics,	with	their	hylo-
morphic	view	of	natural	bodies,	were	committed	to	animals	having	a	motive	
or	 sensitive	 soul.	 They	were	 among	Descartes’	 likely	 targets	 in	Discourse 
part	five.
42.	 AT	VI	56–7,	CSM	I	140.
43.	 Similarities	between	Descartes’	claims	in	the	Discourse and	Turing’s	famous	
simulation	 test	 have	 been	 noted	 and	 discussed	 by	 several	 scholars.	 Most	
recently,	 Darren	 Abramson	 has	 even	 suggested	 that	 Turing	 was	 directly	
influenced	 by	 Descartes	 (Abramson	 2011,	 which	 also	 summarizes	 the	 lit-
erature	 linking	Descartes	 and	Turing).	 I	would	 note,	 however,	 that	 Turing	
4. No SOM in Descartes’ Discourse
In	part	five	of	 the	Discourse,	Descartes	 synthesizes	 the	 results	of	his	
early	work	 in	physics.	Drawing	on	 the	 then-unpublished	World	 and	
Treatise on Man,	he	presents	his	cosmology	and	mechanical	account	of	
life	before	venturing	into	the	“difference	between	our	soul	and	that	of	
beasts	[la difference qui est entre nostre ame & celle des bestes]”.39	He	writes	
later	in	part	five	of	having	made
special	efforts	to	show	[in	the	Treatise on Man]	that	if	any	
such	[purely	physical]	machines	had	the	organs	and	out-
ward	shape	of	a	monkey	or	of	some	other	animal	that	lacks	
reason,	we	should	have	no	means	of	knowing	 that	 they	
did	not	possess	entirely	the	same	nature	as	these	animals;	
whereas	if	any	such	machines	bore	a	resemblance	to	our	
bodies	and	imitated	our	actions	as	closely	as	possible	for	
all	practical	purposes,	we	should	still	have	 two	very	cer-
tain	means	of	recognizing	that	they	were	not	real	men.40 
There	are	two	important	claims	worth	noticing	in	this	passage.	First,	
Descartes	 is	preparing	us	 to	 consider	machines	 that	bear	only	 “a	 re-
semblance	to	our	bodies”.	He	takes	this	to	mean	that	they	are	indistin-
guishable	from	our	bodies	qua	bodies	for	“all	practical	purposes”.	By	
hypothesis,	then,	these	bodies	lack	minds	and	differ	from	us	only	in	
this	respect.	It	may	look	as	though	we	are	being	asked	to	contemplate	
the	existence	of	mere	human	bodies,	but	we	are	not.	I	explain	why	this	
is	so	in	more	detail	below,	but	note	that	Descartes	is	taking	for	granted	
that	our	physical	duplicates	 are	machines	without	minds,	 and	he	 is	
seeking	to	show	what	machines	cannot	do.	He	is	about	to	describe	the	
limits	of	animal	and	mechanical	intelligence.
Related	to	this	is	a	second	point.	Descartes	is	seeking	a	“means”	of	
knowing	not	that	a	mind	is	present	in	a	given	body	but	rather	that	a	
mind	is	not	present	in	a	given	body.	In	other	words,	he	is	seeking	to	
39.	AT	VI	1,	CSM	I	111.
40.	AT	VI	56,	CSM	I	139–40.
	 gideon	manning Descartes, Other Minds and Impossible Human Bodies
philosophers’	imprint	 –		13		– vol.	12,	no.	16	(november	2012)
However	 unsatisfying	 the	 “language	 test”	may	 seem	 if	 we	 intro-
duce	a	more	robust	matter	theory,	in	the	Discourse, Descartes	proceeds	
immediately	to	the	second	of	his	two	tests:	
[E]ven	 though	such	machines	might	do	some	 things	as	
well	as	we	do	them,	or	perhaps	even	better,	they	would	
inevitably	 fail	 in	 others,	 which	 would	 reveal	 that	 they	
were	 acting	 not	 through	 understanding	 but	 only	 from	
the	disposition	of	 their	organs.	For	whereas	 reason	 is	a	
universal	 instrument	which	 can	be	used	 in	 all	 kinds	 of	
situations,	their	organs	need	some	particular	disposition	
for	each	particular	action;	hence	it	is	morally	impossible	
[moralement impossible]	for	a	machine	to	have	enough	dif-
ferent	organs	to	make	it	act	in	all	the	contingencies	of	life	
in	the	way	in	which	our	reason	makes	us	act.46
This	is	the	“adaptability	test”.	Machines	are	quite	successful	at	perform-
ing	 actions	 their	 organs	 and	 parts	 are	 disposed	 to	 perform.	Where	
machines	are	not	successful	is	in	performing	actions	outside	of	their	
pre-set	or	designed	performance	 range.	Put	 another	way:	Descartes	
is	 reminding	us	 that	 the	arrangements	and	 rearrangements	of	finite	
material	parts	have	a	limit.	By	contrast,	we	who	have	minds	are	able	
to	adapt	 to	an	 infinite	number	of	situations	well	outside	our	bodies’	
design	specifications.	This	is	all	Descartes	means	when	he	calls	reason	
a	“universal	instrument”	in	contrast	to	the	particular	instruments	we	
find	in	machines.
In	the	Discourse, Descartes	is	segregating	machine	look-alikes	from	
real	human	beings	on	the	basis	of	what	we	know	and	can	infer	from	
their	 observed	 behavior.	 By	 providing	 a	means	 of	 falsifying	 our	 be-
lief	that	the	living	things	that	look	like	us	have	minds,	however,	Des-
cartes	is	not	falsifying	the	belief	that	they	are	mere	human	bodies.	He	
is	not	showing	that	certain	bodies	have	minds.	Nor	is	he	showing	that	
there	exist	what	I	called	in	section	two	“mere	human	bodies”.	Rather,	
46.	AT	VI	56–7,	CSM	I	140.
only	because	of	specific	changes	“in	its	organs”,	something	we	know	
to	be	the	case	because,	by	hypothesis,	we	are	dealing	with	a	machine,	
and	a	machine	is	merely	a	collection	of	organs	and	material	parts.44	In	
other	words,	arrangements	of	its	material	parts	and	changes	in	these	
arrangements	are	the	sole	basis	on	which	to	conceive	of	the	machine’s	
behavior.	Descartes	concludes	that	the	resemblance	between	us	and	
the	machine	ends	where	meaningful	language	use	begins.45 
It	is	essential	to	Descartes’	first	test	that	meaningful	language	use	
cannot	 be	 conceived	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 arrangements	 and	 rearrange-
ments	 of	material	 parts	 alone.	 The	 specific	 limitations	Descartes	 as-
signs	to	machines	derive	from	his	view	that	matter	is	mere	extension,	
and	I	think	he	is	right	that	his	matter	theory	does	not	equip	us	to	ex-
plain	meaningful	language	use.	But	even	if	we	do	not	accept	Descartes’	
physics	of	extended	matter,	the	language	test	draws	on	the	plausible	
distinction	between	 responding	appropriately	because	of	 a	material	
change	and	responding	appropriately	because	one	knows	what	an	ap-
propriate	 response	 is.	 If	we	 know	 that	 something	 is	 a	machine,	we	
can	know	that	it	is	not	capable	of	using	language	in	a	meaningful	way.	
What	machines	can	do,	at	best,	is	appear	to	use	meaningful	language.
misunderstands	Descartes—as	least	as	I	interpret	the	latter—and	further	that	
the	problem	posed	by	More	in	a	late	letter	to	Descartes	about	the	mindedness	
of	children	poses	as	much	a	problem	for	Turing	as	it	does	for	standard	read-
ings	of	Descartes’	language	test.	
44.	 Descartes	also	believed	that	a	human	being’s	behavior	is	made	possible	by	its	
organs,	although	the	organs	do	not	suffice	to	explain	every	human	action.	In	
the	Description of the Human Body,	Descartes	writes	that	“the	soul	cannot	pro-
duce	any	movement	in	the	body	without	the	appropriate	disposition	of	the	
bodily	organs	which	are	required	for	making	the	movement”.	Descartes	even	
goes	on	to	say,	“[W]hen	all	the	bodily	organs	are	appropriately	disposed	for	
some	movement,	the	body	has	no	need	of	the	soul	in	order	to	produce	that	
movement”	(AT	XI	225,	CSM	I	315).
45.	 The	originality	of	this	first	test	was	challenged	by	the	late-seventeenth-cen-
tury	anti-Cartesian	Pierre-Daniel	Huet:	“When	[Descartes]…taught	that	man	
is	distinguished	 from	 the	animals	by	 speech,	 this	had	already	been	 taught	
by	Pythagoras,	Plato,	Cicero,	Quintilian,	Galen,	and	others”	(Huet	2003,	221).	
For	 discussion	 of	 the	 early	modern	 interest	 in	 language	 and	 the	 language	
capacities	of	animals,	see	Serjeantson	2001.
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juxtaposing	the	letter	to	More	with	Descartes’	Meditations	and	his	tech-
nical	use	of	the	Latin complexio in	his	description	of	our	“nature”.	By	the	
end	of	 this	 section,	we	will	 see	 that	Descartes	continued	 to	assume	
that	human	bodies	will	have	minds	until	proven	otherwise,	just	as	he	
had	done	in	the	Discourse,	only	that	in	response	to	More	he	is	willing	to	
add	that	appeals	to	the	origins	of	our	species,	God’s	immutable	nature	
and	the	human	body	in	particular	can	answer	SOM.	In	other	words,	it	
is	Descartes’	belief	that	all	human	bodies	must	have	minds,	which	is	
precisely	what	Cordemoy	failed	to	appreciate.
Just	prior	to	the	letter	we	are	interested	in,	Descartes	writes	boldly	
to	More	about	the	link	between	mindedness	and	language	use:	
…speech	 is	 the	only	certain	sign	of	 thought	hidden	 in	a	
body.	All	human	beings	use	it,	however	stupid	and	insane	
they	may	be,	even	though	they	may	have	no	tongue	and	
organs	 of	 voice;	 but	 no	 animals	 do.	 Consequently	 this	
can	be	taken	as	a	real	specific	difference	between	humans	
and	animals.48 
This	is	not	quite	the	position	from	the	Discourse.	Descartes	is	here	telling	
More	that	we	never	encounter	a	human	being	who	fails	to	show	genu-
ine	language	use.	More	responds	with	a	devastating	counterexample:
But	neither	do	 infants,	 at	 least	 for	many	months,	while	
during	 that	 time	 they	 cry,	 laugh,	 have	fits	 of	 anger,	 etc.	
Nevertheless,	I	assume	you	would	not	deny	that	infants	
are	alive	and	possess	a	thinking	soul.49
More	cuts	to	the	quick	on	the	language	test	if	it	is	taken	as	evidence	
for	the	existence	of	other	minds.	If	the	“only	certain	sign”	that	a	mind	
is	present	in	a	body	is	that	the	living	body	uses	speech,	what	are	we	
48.	AT	V	278,	CSMK	366.	
49.	 “Nec infantes ulli, per aliquam multa saltem mensium spatia, quamvis plorent, ride-
ant, irascantur &c. Nec diffidis tamen, opinor, quin infantes sint animati, animamque 
habeant cogitantem”	(AT	V	311).
the	default	belief	 for	Descartes	(and	his	Aristotelian	contemporaries,	
though	for	different	reasons	than	the	ones	given	in	the	Discourse)	 is	
that	all	living	human	bodies	have	minds,	and	nowhere	in	the	Discourse 
does	Descartes	take	the	step	of	wondering	why	he	thinks	this	or	wheth-
er	he	 should.	As	 a	 result,	 the	Discourse	 is	 hardly	 a	 starting	point	 for	
SOM.	As	I	indicated	when	discussing	the	opening	passage	to	the	two	
tests,	 the	 “means	of	 recognizing” are	best	understood	as	clarifications 
of	something	we	already	know.	The	two	tests	simply	offer	an	illustra-
tion	of	what	machines	can	and	cannot	do.	In	fact,	both	tests	seem	to	
reduce	to	the	idea	that	the	behavior	of	machines	and	animals	is	limited	
to	the	diverse	arrangement	of	their	many	parts.	This	is	the	advertised	
difference	between	our	souls,	which	are	not	so	limited,	and	the	souls	of	
beasts,	which,	not	being	immaterial,	are	limited	in	just	this	way.47
5. Descartes’ answer to SOM
Having	 now	 dispatched	 the	 most	 prominent	 texts	 associated	 with	
SOM	in	Descartes’	work	and	shown	that	they	fail	to	engage	with	SOM,	
I	hope	to	have	at	least	made	plausible	my	suggestion	that	Descartes	
does	not	share	Cordemoy’s	assumption	that	the	human	body	can	exist	
without	a	mind.	We	are	left	with	only	one	additional	passage	to	con-
sider.	It	comes	from	the	same	late	letter	from	Descartes	to	Henry	More	
cited	in	the	previous	section,	although	this	time	the	issue	is	not	about	
the	 attributes	 of	 corporeal	 substance.	 Rather,	 the	 subject	 under	 dis-
cussion	is	part	five	of	the	Discourse.	Quickly,	however,	the	topic	turns	
to	SOM.	In	this	section,	I	will	trace	this	movement	from	a	discussion	
of	animal	souls	 to	other	minds,	and	 I	will	 reconstruct	Descartes’	an-
swer	to	the	version	of	SOM	presented	by	More.	Doing	so	will	require	
47.	 A	more	typical	description	of	Descartes’	final	position	is	that	we	have	souls	
and	animals	do	not.	However	 tempting	 this	description	may	be—and	Des-
cartes	does	mostly	equate	“soul”	with	“rational	soul”	or	“mind”,	thereby	deny-
ing	the	existence	of	any	soul	save	our	own	(for	discussion,	see	Cottingham	
1992,	236;	cf.	Fowler	1999,	chapter	5)—the	qualification	that	animals	lack	im-
material	or	immortal	souls	is	the	key	point,	and	on	several	occasions	outside	
of	the	Discourse, Descartes	refers	to	the	material	souls	of	animals	(e. g.,	AT	I	
414–15,	CSMK	62).	Also	recall	the	initial	description	of	what	we	are	told	to	
expect	from	the	two	tests	(AT	VI	1,	CSM	I	111).
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Interpretation	and	reconstruction	is	required	here.	First,	we	must	
show	that	Descartes	is	not	begging	the	question.	Second,	we	need	to	
provide	an	alternative	way	to	understand	the	language	test	from	the	
Discourse so	as	 to	avoid	being	 cornered	 into	accepting	 that	 infants	
either	use	language	or	lack	minds.	The	interpretation	I	offered	in	the	
previous	 section	 for	 those	 passages	 in	which	Descartes	 first	 intro-
duced	the	language	test	suggests	a	way	of	satisfying	the	second	need.	
If	he	is	not	interested,	in	the	Discourse, in	showing	which	bodies	have	
minds	but	only	which	bodies	do	not,	then	the	language	test	cannot	
be	used	in	the	way	the	correspondence	with	More	suggests.52	Alter-
natively,	one	could	liken	the	case	of	infants	to	that	of	adults	who	are	
not	using	language	at	the	present	time—e. g.,	they	are	daydreaming,	
they	are	not	listening,	no	one	is	talking	to	them,	etc.	In	such	cases,	we	
presume	that	they	have	a	capacity	or	ability	to	speak,	and	therefore	
we	judge	that	they	have	minds.	Perhaps	in	the	case	of	infants,	Des-
cartes	is	telling	us	that	infants	have	the	potential	to	develop	the	ca-
pacity	to	speak	and	that,	by	virtue	of	this	fact,	they	must	have	minds.
More	interesting,	I	think,	is	the	possibility	of	finding	a	defensible	
answer	to	SOM	by	showing	that	Descartes	is	not	arguing	in	a	circle.53 
by	the	example	of	 infants	 is	 just	that	there	is	no	strict	correlation	between	
evident	 linguistic	 competence,	 and	 ascriptions	 of	mentality	 that	Descartes	
himself	would	endorse.	Descartes’	answer	does	not	address	this	implication” 
(Wilson	1999,	498).
52.	When	Descartes	writes	that	language	is	the	only	“sure	sign”	of	thought,	in	
his	earlier	correspondence	with	More,	he	presents	a	view	inconsistent	with	
my	interpretation	of	the	Discourse.	The	best	strategy	I	can	imagine	here	is	to	
interpret	Descartes’	appeal	 to	“sure	signs”	as	 tantamount	to	assuming	that	
genuine	language	use	cannot	occur	without	a	mind	being	present.	Ergo,	if	
this	is	an	instance	of	genuine	language	use,	then	we	have	a	“sure	sign”	that	a	
mind	is	present.	This	affirms	the	relationship	between	genuine	language	use	
and	mindedness,	but	it	hardly	eliminates	the	difficulty	of	deciding	whether	
we	are	encountering	genuine	language	use	in	a	specified	case.	Not	wanting	
to	confront	this	difficulty	characterizes	Descartes’	use	of	 the	 language	test,	
however,	and	suggests	again	that	the	test	is	actually	directed	to	falsifying	a	
belief	that	a	mind	is	present	in	a	given	body.	
53.	With	 the	 sole	 exception	 of	Alan	Gabbey,	 I	 know	of	 no	 commentator	who	
has	 taken	 the	 response	 to	More	 to	 hold	 any	 promise	 (Gabbey	 1990).	 The	
argument	I	reconstruct	is	indebted	to	Gabbey’s	work,	although	we	marshal	
to	say	of	infants?	How	do	we	know	that	other	minds	exist	in	this	case?	
More’s	 question	 challenges	 Descartes	 to	 deal	 with	 an	 instance	 in	
which,	by	hypothesis,	a	mind	is	present	but	hidden	by	virtue	of	failing	
the	language	test.	
Unlike	anything	we	have	encountered	so	far	in	Descartes,	this	is	
an	expression	of	SOM	precisely	because	Descartes	 is	challenged	to	
confirm	a	belief	 in	 the	existence	of	other	minds	by	articulating	 the	
inference	we	make	in	the	course	of	forming	our	belief.	He	is	not	called	
upon	to	describe	the	general	manner	in	which	we	can	come	to	know	
anything—as	was	his	topic	in	the Meditations—but	rather	he	must	ex-
plain	specifically	how	he	justifies	his	belief	in	the	existence	of	other	
minds.	 In	effect,	More	 is	 asking	how	Descartes	knows	 that	 a	given	
human	body	has	a	mind	if	we	cannot	infer	anything	on	the	basis	of	
its	behavior.
In	responding	to	More’s	version	of	SOM,	Descartes	is	not	consider-
ing	a	question	that	he	raised	himself.	He	should	not	be	seen	as	some-
how	creating	SOM.	Still,	Descartes’	answer	should	be	instructive,	and	
it	is	unfortunate	that	it	looks	to	be	anything	but	responsive:	
Infants	are	in	a	different	case	from	animals:	I	should	not	
judge	that	infants	were	endowed	with	minds	unless	I saw 
that they were of the same nature as adults [eiusdem naturae 
cum adultis];	but	animals	never	develop	to	a	point	where	
any	certain	sign	of	thought	can	be	detected	in	them.50
This	 reply	 is	 especially	 unhelpful	 because	 it	 fails	 to	 elaborate	what	
Descartes	 means	 by	 “the	 same	 nature”.	 If	 we	 interpret	 having	 “the	
same	nature”	as	sharing	an	essence,	which	would	be	the	most	natural	
reading,	Descartes	is	telling	More	that	infants	are	the	same	as	adults	
and	that	therefore	they	have	minds.	Clearly	this	begs	the	question	of	
whether	infants	have	minds.51 
50.	AT	V	345,	CSMK	374;	emphasis	added.
51.	 Gabbey	 1990	 offers	 a	 similar	 analysis,	 although	Margaret	Wilson	 puts	 the	
trouble	with	Descartes’	answer	best:	“The	claim	that	More	meant	to	support	
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…for	by	“nature,”	taken	generally,	I	understand	only	God	
himself	or	the	coordination,	instituted	by	God,	of	created	
things.	I	understand	nothing	else	by	my	nature	in	particu-
lar	than	the	totality	of	all	the	things	[complexionem eorum 
omnium]	 bestowed	 on	 me	 by	 God.	 (Meditations,	 Cress	
trans.,	emphasis	added)
Whereas	Cottingham	translates	“eorum omnium”	as	“totality	of	things”,	
Cress	reserves	“totality”	for	“complexionem”	and	uses	“of	all	the	things”	
as	a	translation	of	“eorum omnium”.	Cress’	choice	is	certainly	better,	but	
our	complexio	is	not	simply	a	“totality”.56 
To	 see	why	Cress’	 translation	 is	 inadequate,	 consider	 two	 seven-
teenth-century	translations	of	the	Meditations into	French	and	English.	
In	his	1647	French	translation,	Louis-Charles	d’Albert,	Duc	de	Luynes,	
renders	“complexionem”	as	“complexion”,	effectively	preserving	it	by	leav-
ing	it	untranslated.	William	Molyneux’s	1680	English	translation	opts	
for	the	same	strategy,	rendering	“complexionem”	as	“complexion”.57	The	
precedent	set	by	these	earlier	translations	suggests	that	an	appropriate	
amendment	to	the	Cottingham	translation	may	be	the	following:	“by	
my	own	nature	in	particular	I	understand	nothing	other	than	the	com-
plexio	of	all	those	things	[complexionem eorum omnium]	bestowed	on	me	
by	God”.	Yet	this	does	not	help	modern	readers,	because	we	still	need	
to	know	what	our complexio	is	if	not	a	totality.	
The	sense	of	“nature”	at	stake	in	the	passage	from	the	Meditations, 
and	in	the	letter	to	More,	is	tied	to	the	resurgence	of	Greek	and	Latin	
learning	at	Salerno	during	the	eleventh	century.58	To	resolve	interpreta-
56.	Desmond	Clarke’s	 translation	of	 the	Meditations	 renders	 complexio	 as	 “com-
plex”,	whereas	Michael	Moriarty	renders	it	as	“combination”	(Descartes	1998	
and	2008,	respectively).	These	may	be	better	choices	than	“totality”,	but	they	
are	misleading	for	the	same	reasons	I	am	about	to	offer	against	“totality”.
57.	 A	number	of	English	editions	of	Molyneux’s	translation	can	be	found	online	
at	Early	English	Books	Online,	but	a	copy	is	also	contained	in	the	appendix	to	
Gaukroger	2006,	237.
58.	At	 least	 two	reasons	 to	question	my	particular	emphasis	on	complexio are	
adduced	 in	 note	 63	 below.	My	 account	 of	 the	 term’s	 origins relies	 upon	
The	key	to	Descartes’	salvation	lies	in	his	claim	that	he	recognized	in-
fants	“were	of	the	same	nature	as	adults	[eiusdem naturae cum adultis].”	
But	what	conception	of	 “nature”	 is	Descartes	working	with	here?	 In	
order	to	answer	this	question,	we	should	look	to	Meditation	VI	where	
Descartes	discussed	the	various	meanings	of	“nature”:54 
For	if	nature	is	considered	in	its	general	aspect,	then	I	un-
derstand	by	the	term	[1]	nothing	other	than	God	himself,	
or	[2]	the	ordered	system	of	created	things	established	by	
God.	And	by	my	own	nature	 in	particular	 I	understand	
[3]	nothing	other	than	the	totality	of	things	[complexionem 
eorum omnium]	bestowed	on	me	by	God.55
The	sense	of	“nature”	brought	to	bear	in	the	letter	to	More	is	surely	the	
third	of	these	three,	which	is	the	only	one	that	pertains	directly	to	us.	
The	key	phrase	is	“complexionem eorum omnium”.	And	the	question	now	
is:	What	is	our	complexio?
There	 is	 no	 explicit	 answer	 to	 this	 question	 in	 the	 secondary	 lit-
erature	 related	 to	Descartes,	 and	 current	English	 translations	of	 the	
Meditations are	of	 little	help,	as	are	seventeenth-century	 translations,	
though	for	a	different	reason.	In	the	excellent	and	now	standard	trans-
lation	done	by	John	Cottingham,	et	al.,	that	I	have	cited	up	until	now,	
the	word	complexionem	 is	left	out,	which	deprives	us	of	needed	guid-
ance.	Donald	Cress	attempts	a	translation	that	includes	complexionem:
slightly	different	evidence	for	our	claims.	Some	of	 the	differences	between	
our	views	are	these:	(1)	I	think	better	of	the	prospects	for	a	“substantial	union”	
of	mind	and	body	in	Descartes;	(2)	I	do	not	believe	“divine	light”,	in	the	form	
of	 biblical	 evidence	 that	God	wants	 to	 save	human	beings—plural—enters	
into	Descartes’	response;	and	(3)	I	endorse	the	purely	physical	character	of	
our	complexio	or	nature	(on	this	last	difference,	see	note	63	below).
54.	 For	discussion	of	the	various	significations	of	“nature”	in	the	late	scholastic	
Aristotelian	tradition,	see	Des	Chene	1996,	212ff.
55.	 “…per naturam enim, generaliter spectatam, nihil nunc aliud quam vel Deum ip-
sum, vel rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institutam intelligo; nec aliud per 
naturam meam in particulari, quam complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo 
sunt tribute”	(AT	VII	80,	CSM	II	56).
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tradition,	 and	he	would	 surely	have	 expected	his	 readers	 to	 recog-
nize	the	import	of	complexio.59 
To	return,	then,	to	the	issue	that	set	us	going	in	the	correspondence	
with	More—what	“nature”	do	we	share	with	infants—the	answer	is	that	
we	share	 the	same	complexio.	We	share	 the	same	bodily	 constitution.	
If	 this	 is	 right,	 then	 the	appropriate	 follow-up	 to	More’s	 initial	ques-
tion	is:	How	could	citing	a	shared	physical	constitution	help	us	judge	
that	infants	have	minds	even	though	they	display	no	apparent	signs	
of	mentality?	How,	in	other	words,	could	the	mere	presence	of	a	body,	
even	of	a	very	specific	kind,	tell	us	anything	about	the	existence	of	a	
mind?	This	question	will	seem	all	the	more	pressing	when	we	recall	
Descartes’	real	distinction	argument,	so	important	to	Cordemoy’s	dis-
cussion	of	SOM,	and	Descartes’	advice	to	Henricus	Regius	that	“when	
we	 consider	 the	 body	 alone	 we	 perceive	 nothing	 in	 it	 demanding	
union	with	the	soul,	and	nothing	in	the	soul	obliging	it	to	be	united	to	
the	body”.60	Descartes	appears	to	be	telling	Regius	that	the	existence	
of	a	body	will	imply	nothing	about	the	existence	of	a	mind.	Since	the	
mind	and	body	are	really	distinct	substances,	how	could	 identifying	
the	right	complexio	serve	as	a	response	to	More?
To	 be	 as	 clear	 as	 possible	 about	 the	 stakes	 in	 answering	 these	
questions,	Descartes’	unwillingness	to	engage	with	SOM,	and	his	in-
sistence	 that	we	will	not	find	a	human	body,	even	an	 infant’s	body,	
that	lacks	a	mind,	strike	a	blow	against	those	who	interpret	his	privi-
leging	 of	 self-knowledge	 and	 his	 dualism	between	mind	 and	 body	
as	setting	 the	stage	 for	SOM.	All	 the	 textual	evidence	canvassed	 to	
59.	 For	a	 thorough	account	of	Descartes’	knowledge	of	medicine,	 see	Aucante	
2006a.
60.	Descartes’	 remark	 to	Regius	occurs	 in	a	 letter	 that	has	been	 the	subject	of	
dispute	among	commentators	(AT	III	461,	CSMK	200).	Descartes	is	advising	
Regius	how	to	deal	with	colleagues	at	Utrecht	who	might	object	to	Descartes’	
philosophy.	As	a	result,	to	some	readers,	it	seems	that	Descartes	is	offering	
practical	advice	about	how	to	avoid	controversy	rather	than	a	clarification	of	
his	actual	views.	The	fact	that	Descartes’	advice	is	consistent	with	the	posi-
tion	he	takes	against	More	suggests,	however,	that	the	letter	to	Regius	should	
be	taken	as	a	genuine	expression	of	his	considered	view	(for	further	discus-
sion	and	a	different	conclusion,	see	Chappell	1994;	cf.	Hoffman	2009,	15–32).
tive	and	terminological	difficulties	coming	from	the	newly	discovered	
work	of	Galen	and	the	competing	translations	of,	and	commentaries	
on,	his	and	Aristotle’s	natural	philosophy,	professors	at	Salerno	had	
to	make	definitive	 choices	 to	 achieve	 terminological	 clarity.	 In	one	
case	in	particular,	they	turned	to	the	Pantegni,	a	translation	done	by	
Constantine	of	Africa	of	an	extensive	Arabic	medical	encyclopedia	of	
the	tenth	century.	As	far	as	I	have	been	able	to	determine,	complexio 
appears	for	the	first	time	in	the	Pantegni,	and	the	professors	at	Salerno	
embraced	it	to	refer	to	the	temperaments,	i. e.,	the	mixtures	of	quali-
ties	 that	 characterize	 the	 temperaments	 of	 species	 and	 individuals;	
it	corresponds	 to	 the	Arabic	mizāj, which	 is	a	 translation	of	Galen’s	
Greek	crasis.	
The	idea	behind	temperament	or	complexio was	that	the	elements	
of	fire,	air,	water	and	earth	each	possess	unique	qualities—fire	is	hot	
and	dry,	air	is	hot	and	moist,	etc.—and	the	mixture	of	these	elements	
results	 in	a	mixture	of	 fundamental	qualities.	Since	all	natural	bod-
ies	are	mixtures	of	pure	elements,	knowing	the	complexio	of	a	body	
amounts	 to	 knowing	 its	 natural	 balance	 of	 fundamental	 qualities.	
Such	 knowledge	was	 central	 to	Galen’s	 scientific	medicine,	which	
proceeded	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	 natural	 balance	 of	 primary	
qualities	was	the	healthy	state	of	an	individual.	As	late	as	the	seven-
teenth	century,	complexio	and	its	vulgar	language	derivatives	still	car-
ried	the	same	connotation,	with	a	clear	emphasis	on	our	mixed	bodi-
ly	constitution.	The	first	definition	of	the	French	“complexion”	in	the	
Dictionnaire de l’Académie française	(1694)	read	simply,	“temperament,	
constitution	 du	 corps”.	 Similarly,	 Randle	Cotgrave’s	A Dictionary of 
French and English Tongues	 (1632)	rendered	the	French	complexion	 in	
the	first	instance	as	“The	complexion,	making,	temper,	constitution	
of	the	body.”	This	is	persuasive	evidence	that	complexio	still	carried	a	
specific	meaning	in	the	seventeenth	century	stemming	from	its	place	
in	 the	 medical	 tradition.	 Descartes	 was	 well	 acquainted	 with	 this	
Jacquart	1988.	
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doubts	“that	the	mind	begins	to	think	as	soon	as	it	is	infused [infusa est] 
in	the	body	of	an	infant”.62
The	 answer	 to	More	 that	 Descartes	 left	 almost	 entirely	 undevel-
oped	relies	on	God	having	privileged	the	human	complexio	in	his	initial	
act	of	creation	on	the	Sixth	Day.63	This	act	still	resonates	for	the	simple	
reason	that,	in	spite	of	God’s	infinite	power,	his	willing	never	chang-
es.64	As	Descartes	says	in	numerous	places,	including	The World,	“it	is	
easy	to	accept	that	God…as	everyone	must	know”	is	“immutable	[and]	
always	acts	in	the	same	way”.65	Descartes	took	it	as	obvious	that	it	is	
62.	AT	VII	246,	CSM	II	171;	modified	and	emphasis	added.
63.	This	is	the	answer	Alan	Gabbey	wants	to	endorse	as	well.	For	Gabbey,	how-
ever,	 our	 complexio	 is	 a	blending	of	material	 elements	with	 the	mind.	His	
reading	is	supported	by	Descartes’	claim	later	in	Meditation	Six	to	limit	his	
discussion	of	our	complexio	to	just	“what	God	has	bestowed	on	me	as	a	com-
bination	of	mind	and	body	[ut composito ex mente & corpore]”	(AT	VII	82,	CSM	
II	 57).	 It	 arguably	 also	gains	 support	 from	 the	original	passage	 citing	 com-
plexio—“complexionem eorum omnium quae mihi a Deo sunt tribute	[sic]”—where	
the	relative	clause	goes	with	“eorum omnium”.	This	makes	it	seem	that	God’s	
bestowing	 “all	 the	 things”	 is	 emphasized	 and	 not	 the	 complexio	 that	 God	
gives	us.	I	make	the	case	for	my	interpretation	in	the	text	above.	Regardless	
of	whether	Gabbey’s	 interpretation	 is	 to	 be	 preferred,	 there	 is	 some	prec-
edent	in	Augustine	for	the	general	claim	that	Gabbey	and	I	find	Descartes	
making.	Both	Augustine	and	Descartes	treat	knowledge	of	our	own	bodies	
and	of	Adam’s	body	as	a	way	of	knowing	our	species	generally.	They	then	
infer	that	other	members	of	our	biological	species	must	have	minds	too,	just	
like	we	do	(see	Matthews	1998	and	1999	for	an	interpretation	of	Augustine	
along	these	lines).	Interestingly,	this	makes	the	argument	a	kind	of	argument	
by	analogy	where	we	treat	ourselves	or	Adam	as	an	exemplar	case.	I	do	not	
explore	this	point	in	the	paper,	but	it	is	discussed	in	the	essays	by	Matthews.
64.	Descartes’	account	of	God’s	act	of	creation	and	subsequent	acts	of	will	have	
unusual	modal	implications	in	the	so-called	“doctrine	of	eternal	truths”,	ac-
cording	to	which,	as	I	understand	it,	anything	created	is	at	most	contingently	
necessary	but	not	necessarily	necessary	(see,	e. g.,	AT	I	145–146,	CSMK	23).	
God’s	 immutable	 nature	 is	 necessarily	 necessary.	 Sidestepping	 these	 con-
tentious	 issues,	what	matters	 for	my	argument	 is	 that,	 after	 the	 initial	 act	
of	 creation,	Descartes	 insists	 that	God’s	 relationship	 to	his	 creation	never	
changes.	This	captures	the	necessity	Descartes	attributes	to	the	laws	of	na-
ture	deriving	from	God’s	immutable	nature	and,	I	believe,	the	same	kind	of	
necessity	precludes	 the	possibly	of	mere	human	bodies	 (for	discussion	of	
Descartes’	laws,	see	Gabbey	1980;	Garber	1992,	197ff;	Gaukroger	1995,	241ff;	
and	Machamer	and	McGuire	2009).
65.	AT	X	38,	CSM	I	93.	See	also	AT	VIIIA	61,	CSM	I	240	and	AT	I	145–146,	CSMK	23.
this	point,	where	the	question	of	the	human	body’s	possible	existence	
without	a	mind	ought	to	have	been	raised,	points	to	Descartes	not	hav-
ing	the	right	conception	of	the	human	body	to	generate	SOM.	Earlier,	
in	section	two,	I	argued	that	in	order	to	account	for	the	emergence	of	
SOM,	it	is	not	enough	to	admit	to	an	asymmetry	between	the	way	in	
which	I	come	to	know	I	exist	as	a	thinking	thing	and	the	way	in	which	
I	come	to	know	you	exist.	Cordemoy	took	the	relevant	question	to	be	
whether	the	bodies	“that	are	in	all	things	like	mine”	have	minds,	and	
this	presumes	a	conception	of	human	bodies	not	depending	on	or,	by	
their	nature,	 implicating	the	existence	of	a	mind.	Such	a	conception	
was	lacking	in	the	Aristotelian	tradition	as	well	as	Descartes’	answer	to	
More,	and	ultimately	the	significance	of	our	human	complexio	suggests	
that	Descartes	lacks	such	a	conception	of	the	human	body.	This	entails	
that	Descartes’	break	with	the	scholastic	Aristotelian	tradition	is	not	as	
stark	in	the	case	of	living	human	bodies	as	is	normally	thought,	a	point	
to	which	I	will	return	to	in	my	conclusion	below.	
But	now	for	Descartes’	response	to	More	and	SOM.	The	first	point	
to	 notice	 about	 the	 human	 complexio is	 that	 there	 is	 nothing	 super-
natural	about	it.	We	derive	our	bodily	constitution	from	our	parents,	
who	derived	it	from	their	parents,	and	so	on,	as	a	result	of	the	natural	
propagation	of	members	of	our	species.61	In	this,	we	are	no	different	
from	any	other	living	thing	not	spontaneously	generated.	What	distin-
guishes	us	is	that	our	complexio	is	unique	to	our	species	and,	more	than	
this,	Descartes	is	committed	to	members	of	our	biological	species	all	
having	minds	for,	in	the	beginning,	God	ordained	that	beings	with	our	
complexio	would	be	given	minds.	According	to	Descartes,	it	is	our	com-
plexio that links	us	to	our	forebears	and	ultimately	to	Adam	and	Eve.	
Starting	with	them	and	continuing	to	the	present	day,	members	of	our	
species	have	had	minds	(to	say	nothing	of	sin),	and	Descartes	never	
61.	 That	 our	 parents	 are	 the	 proximate	 cause	 of	 our	 physical	 existence	 is	 inti-
mated	at	AT	VII	49,	CSM	II	34	and	stated	explicitly	at	AT	XI	253ff.	For	more	
on	Descartes’	embryology,	where	 the	causal	contribution	of	each	parent	 is	
emphasized,	see	Descartes	2000;	Des	Chene	2001,	32ff.;	and	Aucante	2006b.	
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grow	from	seeds	than	to	consider	how	they	were	created	
by	God	at	the	very	beginning	of	the	world.66
Once	 we	 confirm	 a	 shared	 complexio through	 natural	 propagation,	
which	is	a	matter	of	natural	growth	“from	seeds”,	SOM	can	be	put	to	
rest.67	All	this	is	a	simple	matter	of	confirming	a	natural	fact,	just	like	
confirming	any	other	natural	fact	about	the	material	world.	It	is	for	this	
reason	that	Descartes	did	not	need	to	do	what	Cordemoy	thought	was	
required,	namely	offer	an	additional	proof	for	the	existence	of	other	
minds.	Unless	we	still	have	doubts	about	 the	existence	of	 the	mate-
rial	world,	we	can	proceed	to	dispose	of	SOM	in	the	same	way	we	go	
about	disposing	of	doubts	related	to	the	existence	of	the	sky,	Earth	or	
any	other	particular	body.	From	Descartes’	point	of	view,	we	are	en-
titled	to	be	as	confident	about	the	existence	of	other	minds	as	we	are	
about	the	existence	of	other	human	bodies.	
This	 reconstruction	 of	 Descartes’	 response	 to	 More	 avoids	 bur-
dening	Descartes	with	begging	the	question	of	whether	infants	have	
minds.	Emphasizing	our	shared	complexio	is,	I	think,	our	best	prospect	
for	saving	Descartes.	Beyond	its	saving	graces	as	part	of	a	response	to	
More,	however,	emphasizing	our	complexio	is	consistent	with	other	of	
Descartes’	 texts	where	he	 indicates	 that	 the	human	body	must	exist	
together	with	 a	 human	mind.	Consider	 just	 one	 example.68	Writing	
to	Regius,	Descartes	explains:	“…if	the	body	has	all	the	dispositions	
required	to	receive	a	soul,	and	without	which	it	is	not	strictly	a	human	
body	 [& sine quibus non est propriè humanum corpus],	 then	 short	 of	 a	
miracle	it	must	be	united	to	a	soul”.69	This	is	precisely	what	Descartes	
is	trying	to	convey	in	his	reply	to	More.	By	virtue	of	their	complexio, in-
66.	AT	VIIIA	100,	CSM	I	256.
67.	 For	discussion	of	the	nature	of	“seeds”	during	Descartes’	time,	including	their	
purely	physical	or	material	character,	see	Roger	1963	and	Hirai	2005.	For	the	
presence	of	seemingly	anti-dualist	views	about	seeds	and	embryology	within	
the	earlier	Neo-Platonic	dualist	tradition,	see	Wilberding	2008.
68.	See	also	AT	IV	166–170.
69.	AT	III	460–461,	CSMK	200;	modified.
part	of	God’s	nature	and	a	mark	of	God’s	perfection	that	God	is	immu-
table.	One	might	say	God	is	so	perfect	he	never	makes	a	mistake,	and	
never	making	a	mistake,	God	never	has	to	change	or	alter	his	ways.	As	
a	result,	whenever	we	gain	specific	knowledge	of	God’s	initial	act	of	
creation,	the	source	of	which	is	the	Bible	in	this	case,	we	can	use	this	
knowledge	to	infer	from	what	God	did	in	the	beginning	to	what	God	
will	always	continue	to	do.	 In	Descartes’	physics,	 these	claims	come	
together	to	support	the	laws	of	nature	that	control	motion,	which	is	
the	context	for	the	passage	just	cited.	In	the	letter	to	More,	God’s	im-
mutability	helps	explain	why	Descartes	fails	to	see	an	infant’s	body	as	
an	unthinking	machine	or	a	mere	human	body.	Recall	what	he	wrote	
to	More:	“I	should	not	judge	that	infants	were	endowed	with	minds	
unless	I	saw	that	they	were	of	the	same	nature	as	adults.”	More	wanted	
to	know	about	the	viability	of	the	language	test	as	a	way	to	respond	to	
SOM.	Descartes,	however,	was	more	interested	in	what	the	origin	of	a	
body	tells	us	about	its	nature.
To	 be	 clear:	 I	 am	 suggesting	 that	 our	 general	 understanding	 of	
God’s	 immutable	nature	coupled	with	the	 infant’s	having	been	natu-
rally	propagated	is	what	assures	us	that	the	infant	has	a	mind.	Does	
the	 infant	 have	 the	 right	 complexio	 connecting	 it	 to	 the	 progeny	 of	
Adam	and	Eve?	According	to	Descartes,	this	is	the	only	question	we	
need	to	answer	when	confronted	with	SOM,	and	there	is	no	special	
epistemological	challenge	lurking	in	this	question.	
Descartes’	interest	in	the	origin	of	a	body,	any	body,	is	a	prominent	
feature	of	his	physics	generally	and	not	unique	to	the	human	body.	In	
the	Principles, he	writes:	
Adam	and	Eve	were	not	born	as	babies	but	were	created	
as	fully	grown	people.	This	is	the	doctrine	of	the	Christian	
faith,	and	our	natural	reason	convinces	us	that	it	was	so….	
Nevertheless,	 if	 we	want	 to	 understand	 the	 nature	 of…
men,	it	is	much	better	to	consider	how	they	can	gradually	
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“perfectly	solid	body”.72	The	introduction	of	motion	into	this	body	is	a	
separate	act	in	The World,	though	it	is	also	said	to	be	part	of	the	first	
“act	of	creation”	of	the	solid	body.	Conceiving	a	solid	body	and	then	
only	subsequently	the	introduction	of	motion	implies	that	Descartes	
would	accept	that	motion	is	not	among	the	essential	properties	of	a	
corporeal	 substance	but,	 to	 the	contrary,	he	 repeatedly	 lists	motion	
among	 the	modes	 of	 a	 corporeal	 substance.73	Descartes’	 substance-
mode	ontology	is	not	easily	applied	to	the	case	of	 the	human	body	
and	the	human	mind,	yet,	perhaps,	something	similar	can	be	inferred	
about	 the	 creation	of	 a	human	body	 that	has	 a	mind	 subsequently	
“infused”	into	it	by	God.	My	claims	in	this	paper	have	given	us	reason	
to	believe	that	what	appear	as	conceptually	distinct	acts	by	God	may	
result	 in	an	essential	combination.	This	 is	suggestive	but	obviously	
not	definitive.
What	is	definitive,	however,	is	that	when	it	comes	to	finding	mere	
human	bodies,	Descartes’	position	 is	not	 so	different	 from	 the	scho-
lastic	Aristotelian’s	position.	Both	Descartes	and	the	Aristotelians	take	
the	 human	 body	 to	 implicate	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 human	 soul.	 But	
why,	then,	are	we	so	often	told,	especially	by	Descartes	himself,	that	
it	was	one	of	Descartes’	goals	in	physics	to	replace	the	scholastic	view	
of	bodies	as	matter-form	composites	with	a	view	of	bodies	as	mere	
extension?74	How	does	this	goal	fit	with	his	views	about	the	human	
body?	And	specifically,	 if	 the	human	body	 is	not	a	body	 like	all	 the	
others,	what	kind	of	body	is	it?	What	is	the	relation	between	the	liv-
ing	human	body,	the	embryo’s	body	and	the	human	corpse?	Does	the	
physicist	get	to	study	the	human	body,	or	is	it	reserved	for	the	meta-
physician	 or,	 possibly,	 the	 physician?75	 These	 questions	 gain	 added	
72.	AT	XI	33;	CSM	I	91.
73.	 See,	e. g.,	AT	VIIIB	32,	CSM	I	216.
74.	 See,	e. g.,	AT	XI	31ff.,	CSM	I	90ff.
75.	 This	question	runs	parallel	 to	the	question	of	who	studies	the	human	soul,	
which	we	know	must	be	embodied,	because	of	 the	unique	character	of	 its	
sensory	 experience.	Gary	Hatfield	has	 addressed	 this	 parallel	 question	on	
several	 occasions,	 and,	 if	 I	 understand	 him	 correctly,	 his	 view	 is	 that	 the	
fants	have	“all	of	the	dispositions	required	to	receive	a	soul”.	And,	bar-
ring	a	miracle,	they	must	have	a	soul	or	mind.70	In	other	words,	human	
bodies	without	a	mind	are	impossible	human	bodies.
6. Conclusion
Once	our	doubts	about	the	existence	of	the	external	world	are	put	to	
rest,	Descartes	never	shows	any	signs	of	being	willing	to	accept	that	
a	fully	functioning,	living	human	body	will	exist	without	a	mind.	Our	
own	existence	as	a	composite	of	mind	and	body	is	part	of	a	pattern,	
the	precedent	 for	which	God	established	with	Adam.	Whether	 this	
means	 that	 the	 essence	of	 the	human	body	 somehow	 includes	 the	
mind	 for	Descartes	 is	a	possibility	 in	need	of	 further	 study,	 though	
there	is	no	space	to	pursue	it	here.71	But	there	is	a	parallel	case	that	
suggests	it	is	a	possibility.	In	the	initial	act	of	creation	related	to	cor-
poreal	substance	in	The World,	Descartes	describes	God	as	creating	a	
70.	In	another	letter	to	Regius,	Descartes	hypothesizes	that	“if	an	angel	were	in	
a	human	body,	he	would	not	have	sensations	as	we	do,	but	would	simply	
perceive	the	motions	which	are	caused	by	external	objects,	and	in	this	way	
would	differ	from	a	real	man”	(AT	III	493,	CSMK	206).	This	may	appear	to	
contradict	what	I	have	tried	to	show	Descartes	finds	impossible—that	a	hu-
man	body	could	exist	in	the	natural	world	without	a	mind—but	that	would	be	
a	misreading.	First,	it	overlooks	the	fact	that,	in	this	case,	too,	where	there	is	a	
human	body	there	is	a	mind,	albeit	an	angel’s	mind.	Second,	there	are	histori-
cal	reasons	to	doubt	whether	anyone	thought	a	demonic	or	angelic	presence	
in	the	human	body	could	occur	without	a	human	soul	also	being	present;	the	
demonic	soul	taking	possession	of	the	human	body	was	referred	to	as	an	“as-
sisting	form	[forma assistens]”	(for	discussion,	see	van	Ruler	1995,	187ff.).	And	
finally,	one	would	certainly	be	justified	in	calling	angelic	or	demonic	posses-
sion	miraculous.
71.	 Differing	views	on	the	nature	of	the	union	between	mind	and	body	appear	
in,	e. g.,	Chappell	1994,	Hoffman	2009,	Cottingham	1985,	Schmaltz	1992,	Voss	
1994,	Rozemond	 1998	 and	2010,	 Skirry	 2005	 and	Machamer	 and	McGuire	
2009.	Regardless	of	how	much	one	emphasizes	that	Descartes	is	a	dualist	or	
a	proponent	of	quasi-Aristotelian	hylomorphism,	the	fact	that	I	have	labored	
to	bring	out	is	that	Descartes	is	committed	to	living	human	bodies	always	ex-
isting	with	minds.	My	own	view	on	the	nature	of	the	union	is	that	Descartes’	
position	tended	toward	viewing	the	union	as	the	human	body	itself,	which	is,	
ontologically	speaking,	a	more	complicated	body	than	any	of	the	others	that	
appear	in	the	natural	world.	Questions	about	the	union	then	become	ques-
tions	about	the	ontology	of	the	human	body.	I	hope	to	defend	and	elaborate	
this	view	in	future	work.	
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